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The cases in this report describe employers' blatant contempt for the 
rights of workers to voice their opinions in the workplace. Obsessed with 
retaining unilateral and total authority over their employees, the owners 
of companies and their agents go to great lengths to crush efforts by 
workers to exercise their right to an independent voice. 
Employers harass, intimidate, and threaten workers with reprisal so 
that they will abandon their quest for union representation. Those who 
emerge as leaders of these attempts at self-organization and those who 
openly question terms and conditions of employment are singled out for 
ridicule, assigned onerous tasks, disciplined, and often fired. 
While management wages a frontal attack on workers, company lawyers 
manipulate the legal process to delay, frustrate and defeat the campaign 
for independent representation. As a result, the right to an independent 
voice for workers has become a mirage. 
These cases highlight deficiencies in current labor law. For a more tech-
nical review of the current status of labor law and industrial democracy 
in the United States see, Workplace Rights: Democracy on the fob, a com-
panion document prepared by the Industrial Union Department ad hoc 
Committee on Organizing and Labor Law Reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
P resident Franklin Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 and gave hope to millions of American workers that their rights on the job were perma-
nently ensured. The National Labor Relations Act (section 
7) promised that the federal government would protect 
"the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively.. .and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose.. .of mutual aid 
or protection." Unfortunately, our industrial relations and 
legal systems no longer deliver on that promise. Amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act in 1947 and 
1959 placed limits on organizing rights and granted em-
ployers extraordinary opportunities to undermine work-
ers' attempts to secure independent representation. 
Particularly important was a provision of the 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments that facilitated attacks on workers' 
organizations under the guise of "employer free speech." 
Nearly fifty years of rulings since then by the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal courts have 
expanded employers' rights to oppose unionizing and 
narrowed protections for workers who seek to exercise 
their rights. 
In recent years employers have become particularly 
aggressive in their response to workers' attempts to form 
unions. The antiunion fervor has been nurtured by in-
creasingly conservative judicial decisions and by twelve 
years of an employer-oriented NLRB during the Reagan 
and Bush administrations. Today in the employer commu-
nity there is a widespread disregard for the legal right of 
workers to self-organization. Moreover, under current 
rules, employers are able to abuse the National Labor 
Relations Act because it sets few limits on their behavior. 
Even where there are legal restrictions on specific actions 
or tactics, the penalties for violations are so meager that 
they have little deterrent effect. If an employer is deter-
mined to oppose unionization, it is virtually impossible 
for workers to achieve collective bargaining protections 
through the NLRB process. 
When the National Labor Relations Act was passed, it 
was viewed as a guarantee that workers who wished to 
organize would be protected from hostile employers. As 
the system it created now functions, however, the law has 
become a tool of antiunionism. Where workers encounter 
strong resistance, it is often the best option to bypass the 
NLRB and use persuasive tactics, including corporate cam-
paigns and community coalitions, to secure bargaining 
rights.The NLRB offers workers an effective route to self-
organization only when employers choose to comply vol-
untarily. This perverse situation is a clear contradiction of 
the original intent of the law. It is outrageous that a nation 
committed to individual freedom would abandon its re-
sponsibility to protect the right of workers to assert free-
dom of association in the workplace. 
Industrial Union Department Case Studies Project 
In 1993, motivated largely by concerns for how best to 
respond to the challenges of the global economy, the 
Clinton administration created the Commission on the 
Future of Worker Management Relations. Chaired by John 
Dunlop, the commission is examining laws that govern 
the workplace, including the National Labor Relations Act. 
Although the Dunlop commission's primary concern is 
to identify policy alternatives that would encourage im-
proved productivity and labor-management cooperation, 
the attention of the Clinton administration to the legal 
framework that governs collective bargaining offers an 
opportunity for workers and their unions to point out in-
equities in the current system. 
In that spirit, the Industrial Union Department (IUD) 
initiated a project to gather sample cases from affiliated 
unions that would highlight aspects of the National Labor 
Relations Act that deserve attention from those evaluating 
the current status of workplace rights. From June 1993 
through May 1994 the IUD collected 255 case studies of 
workers' efforts to organize. One hundred of the cases 
were edited and fully documented, then presented to the 
Dunlop commission. 
Preparation of the cases for the Dunlop commission 
was an important objective of the IUD when this project 
was initiated, but there was another intention as well. 
Although workers who try to form unions and organizers 
who assist them are well aware of the gaping holes in the 
current legal system, many union members and other sup-
porters of the rights of workers in a democratic society 
may not understand the depth of the problem. In this 
report we include an overview of the case studies, plus 
descriptions of twenty of the cases in enough detail to 
convey the trauma workers face when they seek to "form, 
join, or assist labor organizations." We hope that as you 
read the cases you will come to share the concern we 
have about the injustice these workers experience and 
that you will work with us to restore workplace rights 
and return the National Labor Relations Act to its original 
intent. • 
CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW 
"I've Scrubbed These Floors 
for 16 Years... 
Bernice Dowd has worked in Housekeep-
ing at Knox College for the last half of her 
working life. 
Shell be retiring in two years. 
Bernice brings home $147 a week - to buy 
food, to pay heat to clothe herself and to 
keep a roof over her head. 
$147 a week. 
W e think that*s wrong. 
Don't You? 
... and I Can 9t Afford 
to Walk on Them." 
Find out what yau can do to help. 
CaH (217) 522-1112, collect. 
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Even colleges and universities suppress 
workers' rights. This flyer reflects the 
conditions faced by workers at Knox 
College in Illinois, where the employer 
responded to organizing with a textbook 
resistance campaign. 
I n virtually all of the organizing cases col-lected by the IUD, employers implemented broad-ranging campaigns to convince work-ers that their attempt to gain independent repre-
sentation would be fruitless. The scenario is amazingly 
consistent across a wide range of industries and does not 
vary substantially with unit size or region of the country. 
Even those companies that have good relations with 
unionized employees at other facilities, and those with 
functioning employee involvement systems, bitterly 
oppose the organizing aspirations of their nonunion 
employees. This opposition routinely involves the use 
of a management lawyer or consultant who is expert at 
defeating workers' organizing efforts. 
When workers file a petition for a union representa-
tion election, a common employer response is to appeal 
the unit determination or to file some other legal chal-
lenge in order to delay an election. The delay allows the 
company to initiate a multifaceted program, typically in-
volving a combination of enticements and intimidation. 
Management promises improved conditions if the union-
izing effort is defeated, hints at pay raises, and points out 
that no improvements are guaranteed if the self-organiza-
tion effort succeeds. Top management writes letters 
about the dangers of unionizing, including the possibility 
of strikes during which the company may legally hire 
permanent replacements. The likelihood of a plant clos-
ing is often suggested. Workers are required to attend 
"captive audience meetings" during which management 
explains its opposition to independent worker organiza-
tions. Supervisors monitor the situation, gather intelli-
gence on union plans and actions, and hold one-on-one 
meetings with workers to discuss the situation. The cap-
tive audience meetings and one-on-ones are sometimes 
supplemented by small group meetings, which exclude 
employees sympathetic to forming a union. 
Although many employers find ways to run coercive 
and intimidating campaigns within the limits of the law, 
many others openly violate NLRB policies. The most 
common occurrence is discrimination against union 
supporters in job assignments, discipline, and, in many 
cases, discharge. The apparent rationale behind this 
most extreme form of destroying workers' efforts to or-
ganize is that the penalties for violating the law are mod-
est in comparison to the employer's perception of the 
advantages of denying workers an independent voice. 
If in spite of all of this the workers prevail in a repre-
sentation election, the employer often will appeal certifi-
cation to delay bargaining, in some cases for years. Even 
if the appeal fails and the union is certified as the bar-
gaining agent, the company may refuse to bargain in 
good faith as part of a long-term strategy to decertify the 
union. The penalties against employers for bargaining in 
bad faith are as weak and ineffective as the penalties for 
violating the law during the organizing effort. 
These and other issues are dealt with in more detail 
in the cases below. The picture that emerges is not 
pleasant. Employers display no respect for the rights of 
workers to engage in self-organization. Many attorneys 
have become expert at exploiting fine points in the law 
to delay elections and certification, to defeat workers' 
organizing campaigns, and to avoid reaching agreement 
with certified bargaining agents. 
Union-Free Policies and the Suppression of 
Workers' Rights 
Without independent representation provided by a 
union or other employee association, workers have few 
rights on the job. Although there are some limitations 
placed on employers by federal antidiscrimination legis-
lation and by similar state laws, the prevailing principle 
in the United States is "employment at will." Under this 
principle, the employer has total authority to hire, fire, 
discipline, and assign workers. Furthermore, employers 
unilaterally determine terms and conditions of employ-
ment (including pay and benefits) and may unilaterally 
change those terms and conditions without prior notice. 
Indeed, workers who raise questions as individuals 
about working conditions or pay and benefits may be 
fired without recourse. The individual worker's only 
right to protest employer policies and decisions is the 
right to quit. However, the National Labor Relations Act 
does establish rights for workers who join together with 
others to engage in "concerted action." Workers collec-
tively can voice opinions about terms and conditions of 
employment. The Act protects any efforts at "self-organi-
zation," and it specifies a procedure for workers to deter-
mine by majority vote whether they wish to have "inde-
pendent representation." 
In their carefully crafted strategy to repress concerted 
action by employees, companies have deflected atten-
tion from their own authoritarian objectives by attacking 
unions. Thus they adopt union-free policies and wage 
campaigns against unions when their workers try to orga-
nize. This antiunionism is often referred to as union-bust-
ing by those who support an independent voice for work-
ers. By whatever name, the campaign against the union 
focuses attention on the "third party" and allows employ-
ers to repress surreptitiously the rights of their employ-
ees. As you will see from the cases we describe, the way 
these antiunion companies treat their own employees 
who dare speak out for independent representation re-
veals the true target of their venom. 
Employers oppose workers' efforts at self-organization 
in order to avoid being constrained by the workers' inde-
pendent representative. Employers wish to protect their 
own unilateral authority over the workplace and to pre-
serve employment at will. This is why they bitterly resist 
when workers assert their rights to self-organize and seek 
an independent voice. 
Presentation of Cases for Labor Law Reform 
Most of this report is devoted to the stories themselves. 
They are organized based on major theme, but there is a 
fair amount of overlap so that many of the cases easily 
could have been placed in two or three different sections. 
Each section starts with a description of the problems 
illustrated by the cases that follow. Section introductions 
also include descriptive inserts from other cases to high-
light the issues at hand. 
Cases in "Destroying Workers' Organizations" depict 
the union avoidance routine in a variety of settings. "La-
bor Law as a Tool for Employers" reports on cases that 
demonstrate how employers strategically use delays and 
loopholes in the law. The section on "Flagrant Violations 
of the Law" includes the most extreme examples of em-
ployers' disregard for workers' rights and the legal sys-
tem. "Employee Involvement as Union Avoidance" de-
scribes participation and dispute resolution systems in-
stalled to frustrate workers' efforts to organize. The final 
section presents cases in which workers voted for union 
representation in an NLRB election only to be confronted 
by employer "Bargaining to Evade a First Contract." 
In order to give enough detail to describe both the 
tactical and emotional essence of each case, we limited 
ourselves in this collection to 20 of the 255 cases we re-
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Aaron Temporary Services supplies many of 
the workers for Tandy Corporation's Magee 
Company factory in Piggot, Arkansas. When 
Teresa Elkins and her co-workers sought to 
form a union, Magee notified Aaron, which 
played the role of enforcer. 
ceived. Naturally, this meant passing over some exceed-
ingly important issues. For those who are interested in a 
more complete compilation, the 100-case document pre-
pared for the Dunlop Commission is available from the 
Industrial Union Department. Before we move on to the 
stories, we should touch on a couple of the topics not 
addressed directly below. 
We received many cases that dealt with workers who 
are not covered by the NLRB. Most frustrating are those 
in which workers are employed by nonprofit agencies 
that rely on government funding. The NLRB has refused 
jurisdiction because of the government funding, yet state 
public employee boards have refused jurisdiction be-
cause the workers are not employed directly by a state or 
local government agency. These workers find themselves 
in legal limbo where self-organization becomes bogged 
down in endless litigation. 
We also collected many cases that concerned the 
problems contingent workers face. The barriers to self-
organization described in this manual are magnified for 
employees of contractors and temporary agencies. The 
NLRB essentially exempts the company for which the 
work is being performed from any responsibility, mean-
ing that workers have to organize the contractor. If the 
organizing succeeds but then the contractor loses its 
contract, the workers' attempt to secure independent 
representation is rendered meaningless. The host of legal 
technicalities associated with contract labor expands the 
options for employers to resist employee organizing. 
We even found one case in which a temporary agency 
dismissed a worker for "endangering relationship with 
client by participating in union activities." 
We also received cases that demonstrated other im-
portant concerns, ranging from repeat offenders, such as 
one employer who vowed to "never do any goddamn 
business" with an employees' organization, to the prom-
ises and pitfalls of employer agreements to remain neu-
tral during employees' organizing efforts. 
We believe that the cases we have included will help 
all readers appreciate the barriers faced by workers 
brave enough to exercise their workplace rights. The 
object of this report is to raise public awareness about 
the injustices faced by workers and to promote active 
support for the renewal of workplace rights. • 
DESTROYING WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS 
_ ^ 
s*&J *? 
' £tsdo<r>+< 
An Administrative Law Judge determined 
that the owner of Englewood Hospital in 
New Jersey used this hate mail to arouse 
opposition to a unionizing effort by nurses 
even though he knew that there was no 
connection. 
T he cases collected by the IUD represent many industries, all parts of the country, large units and small, and collectively suggest that union busting has become the convention among 
U.S. employers. Although the tactical details vary, the 
theme of the employers' campaigns is consistent. 
Unions are portrayed as third parties interested primarily 
in dues. Union organizers are described as "pushers" 
who make as many promises as required to "sell" the 
union. Workers are warned that there are no guarantees, 
that if they vote for independent representation the two 
sides will "bargain from scratch," and that wages, ben-
efits, and working conditions are just as likely to get 
worse as they are to get better. 
The intention of the standard employer campaign is 
to exploit workers' fears. Attorneys and consultants who 
craft these union-busting strategies know that workers 
might choose not to exercise their right to organize out 
of fear—fear of job loss, fear of strikes, fear of manage-
ment retaliation. It is no accident that antiunion cam-
paigns typically suggest that either closing or layoffs 
could result from unionization. Although such threats 
are technically unfair labor practices (ULPs), the 
employer's free speech rights ensure that with care the 
message can be conveyed without committing a viola-
tion. Even employers who are less careful can use the 
closing threat to undermine support and simply live with 
the ULP, since there is no effective penalty save in the 
most extreme cases where a bargaining order is issued. 
Employers also exploit workers' apprehension of 
strikes, calling attention to strike activity and warning 
that permanent replacements will be hired if a strike is 
called. Management intimidates workers with direct 
threats and more subtle warnings and delivers the mes-
sage in a variety of formats including letters, captive 
audience meetings, one-on-one lectures, and the media. 
Legal challenges and delays also have a debilitating 
effect, contributing to the dashed hopes of potential 
union supporters. 
The best way to understand the effectiveness of the 
union-busting model is to look at some examples of 
how it works. The five cases in this section illustrate a 
range of employer campaigns of varying intensity and 
emphasis. 
AERO METAL FORMS When the fifteen employees 
of Aero Metal Forms sought to organize a union, the 
company's owner hired an attorney who designed a 
prototypical antiunion campaign. This case demon-
strates that management law firms specializing in union 
avoidance have promoted the spread of sophisticated 
union-busting techniques to very small companies. 
ROCK-TENN This firm maintains a reasonable collective 
bargaining relationship at its unionized facilities, but 
when the employees in Columbus, Indiana, sought 
union representation, the company sent a message to 
its other nonunion plants. Rock-Tenn fought viciously, 
using legal and illegal tactics, exploiting NLRB delays, 
engaging in surface bargaining, and openly supporting 
a decertification campaign. 
TEKSID ALUMINUM Teksid is owned by the Italian 
multinational Fiat, which is fully unionized in its home 
country. However, when Teksid employees in Dickson, 
Tennessee, tried to organize, the Italian managers 
followed the U.S. model of union busting with unre-
strained enthusiasm. 
FLEX CABLE Many employers carefully word their 
plant-closing threats to avoid ULP violations, but Flex 
Cable dispensed with niceties and actually shut down 
for a few days to make sure that the threat was clearly 
understood. 
WINDSOR, O'BRIEN, AND CARRINGTON Nursing 
home owners in the Youngstown, Ohio, area have 
joined together in an attempt to suppress their employ-
ees' strong interest in organizing. Assisted by antiunion 
law firms, these employers have adopted a coordinated 
strategy. They fabricate evidence of union misconduct 
and take union campaign material out of context in 
order to challenge NLRB election victories. • 
Even though a strong majority of employ-
ees voiced their support for independent 
representation, first by signing this petition 
and later in an NLRB election, the owners 
of O'Brien Memorial Nursing Home vigor-
ously opposed them. Thirteen workers 
were fired for union activity, and the home 
pursued legal appeals for several years to 
avoid collective bargaining. 
AERO METAL FORMS, INC. • 
International Association of Machinists (1AM) 
WICHITA, KANSAS 
AERO METAL FORMS is a job shop engaged in the manu-
facture of sheet metal and fiberglass parts for military air-
craft. Ninety-five percent of Aero Metal's business comes 
from the Department of Defense. Founded in 1981 by 
James Zaudke, who is the owner and president, the 
company's only facility is located in Wichita. 
An IAM organizing campaign was initiated by em-
ployee Tom Wood, who met with a group of fellow work-
ers on February 25,1991. Within ten days a majority of 
the workers had signed a union authorization petition. 
Two certified letters were mailed to Aero Metal Forms 
president Zaudke, one declaring majority status and re-
questing recognition, the other explaining employee 
rights under the Wagner Act. 
The letters were delivered at noon on March 8. 
Tamara Cummins, Zaudke s secretary, opened them and 
read the demand for recognition out loud to bookkeeper 
Janet Lester. Cummins commented that Zaudke would 
be "greatly upset" and "hell to work with." When he re-
turned from lunch a short while later, Zaudke and 
Cummins met in his office. As Lester later testified, she 
was called in and told that Mr. Zaudke was going to lay 
off Tom Wood "because his dad is some big shot in the 
union at Boeing." Lester was then instructed to "say what 
they wanted me to say about when they received the let-
ters. ... I stated to both of them that I would not lie." 
Lester's refusal to lie foiled a hastily crafted plan to dis-
associate Wood's layoff from the union-organizing drive. 
Nonetheless, at 3:30 that afternoon Zaudke informed 
Wood that he was laid off for "lack of work." One week 
later on March 15 Zaudke terminated Lester for "poor 
work performance." 
The IAM filed a petition for an NLRB election on 
March 12, with the support of twelve of the fifteen em-
ployees. Aero Metal retained attorney William Dye of the 
law firm of Foulston & Siefkin to advise and assist with an 
antiunion campaign. Dye trained supervisors to identify 
and combat union supporters. Under his guidance, 
Zaudke distributed a written set of instructions to the su-
pervisors explaining carefully "the things we can and can-
not do during an organizing campaign." 
Captive audience meetings for employees commenced 
and were held regularly until the election. At the captive 
audience meetings, standard antiunion messages were 
delivered. The meetings were reinforced by a personal 
letter to each employee from Zaudke and by a handout 
with questions and answers about unions. Workers were 
Two-and-one-half hours after the owner of Aero Metal received 
this letter by certified mail notifying him that his employees 
supported independent representation, the leader of the effort 
to unionize was fired. 
warned that they would probably be forced on strike by 
the union, that the law gives the employer the right to 
hire permanent replacements for strikers, and that the 
company would in fact replace them. 
The workers were also told that the employer did not 
have to agree to any union contract demands, and that 
they could lose employer-provided benefits because 
negotiations would start from scratch. They were threat-
ened that the company might go out of business if it felt 
it could not afford the cost of a union contract. In addi-
tion, standard questions were raised about the intrusion 
of a third party and about the union's motivation and 
credibility. 
The antiunion campaign also was waged on the shop 
floor. Zaudke and supervisors remained friendly to work-
ers who expressed doubts about the union, while union 
supporters were treated with hostility. However, this 
disparate treatment was handled very carefully and dis-
associated from any mention of the union. 
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Two additional union supporters lost their jobs, Ken 
Southworth and Gary Spencer. On March 25 Southworth 
was laid off from the plaster pattern shop. Although the 
union did not contest the layoff because the work load in 
the plaster pattern shop was declining, there was a 
dampening effect on support for the union nonetheless. 
Prior to the layoffs of Wood on March 8 and Southworth 
on March 25, Aero Metal had never laid off an employee 
in its ten years of operation. 
Gary Spencer, maintenance man and strong union 
advocate, attracted increased attention from Jim Zaudke. 
Starting in early March Zaudke began to criticize 
Spencer's work and question his decisions. As Spencer 
recalls, "All of a sudden Zaudke started criticizing every-
thing I did. I mean almost every morning when I came 
in Zaudke would holler at me in front of everybody that I 
screwed up this or that job the day before, or that it took 
me too long." When Spencer reported to work on March 
29, "I didn't think I could make it through the day, I was 
so nervous I couldn't even sleep the night before." 
Zaudke started right away, first criticizing Spencer for 
ordering too many casters, then reminding him that he 
had ordered light bulbs six months earlier that were too 
expensive. Finally Zaudke said,"I can't put up with your 
incompetence any more. I don't have to, and I'm not 
going to." Distraught and assuming that he had been 
fired, Spencer gathered his belongings and left. 
When he returned to pick up his final paycheck the 
following Monday, Spencer asked Zaudke why he had 
been fired. Zaudke replied, "I never fired you, and I have 
witnesses." When Spencer asked if it had all been a mis-
understanding, Zaudke would not answer. 
The April 22,1991 election resulted in a six-to-six tie 
with three challenged ballots. The union filed several 
unfair labor practice (ULP) complaints regarding the elec-
tion behavior of Aero Metal. An NLRB field examiner de-
termined that most of the ULP charges were serious 
enough to warrant a hearing. A notable exception was 
the discharge of Gary Spencer, which was judged to be 
unrelated to the organizing campaign. The field 
examiner's conclusion stands in stark contrast to the one 
reached by the Kansas District Unemployment Insurance 
office, which awarded Spencer unemployment benefits: 
"The claimant reports being fired. The employer reports 
the claimant quit. The evidence presented shows the 
claimant was discharged but not for misconduct con-
nected with the work." 
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The Kansas Unemployment Insurance office ruled that Gary Spencer 
had been discharged. Nonetheless, the NLRB accepted the em-
ployer's word that Spencer had quit. The board refused to hold a 
hearing to determine whether he was fired for union activity. 
A hearing was held by an administrative law judge 
(ALT) on October 1 and 2,1991, but a decision was not 
issued until June 3,1992. The ALJ ruled that the behav-
ior of Zaudke and Cummins in the first few hours follow-
ing receipt of the union letter on March 8 was illegal, 
including the discharge of Tom Wood. The judge was 
openly critical of Jim Zaudke ("for whom truth must 
serve a business purpose") and his secretary Tamara 
Cummins ("testifying without regard for the truth"). 
However, the entire antiunion campaign subsequent to 
the firing of Wood was judged to be acceptable. The 
discharge of Janet Lester was allowed. The ballots of 
Southworth and Spencer were thrown out. The com-
pany appealed the decision regarding Wood, and IAM 
appealed the decision regarding Lester. 
On February 10,1993, the NLRB overturned the ALJ 
on only one point: Janet Lester's firing was ruled a ULP, 
as she was discharged "because she refused to fabricate 
evidence." Tom Wood was awarded $3,325 plus interest 
for lost wages; Janet Lester was awarded $1,200 plus 
interest. Tom Wood's ballot was opened on April 5, the 
IAM was declared a 7-to-6 winner, and the union was 
certified April 25,1993. 
By this time all but one of the seven workers who 
voted for the union had been harassed into quitting and 
union support was basically gone, making negotiation of 
a collective bargaining agreement virtually impossible. 
The IAM could not persuade any of the employees to 
participate in negotiations, and it withdrew as collective 
bargaining agent in April 1994. 
Although the NLRB ultimately ruled that the dis-
charges of Wood and Lester were violations and Aero 
Metal was forced to pay approximately $5,000 in lost pay 
and interest, the bulk of the company's intimidation cam-
paign was deemed legal. By carefully training supervi-
sors and avoiding any reference to the union when bad-
gering employees, the company ensured the ultimate 
defeat of the IAM while escaping any lasting conse-
quences from the NLRB ruling. • 
ROCK-TENN CORP. • 
United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU) 
COLUMBUS, INDIANA 
Frustration quickly replaced joy after this 
celebration of an NLRB election victory. 
Rock-Tenn's managers harassed the workers' 
elected leaders while its lawyers evaded 
bargaining and pursued legal appeals. 
ROCK-TENN CORP., based in Norcross, Georgia, owns 
more than sixty paper industry facilities in the United 
States and Canada. Most are nonunion, but the company 
has purchased fifteen unionized shops and has main-
tained a bargaining relationship with the Paperworkers at 
those facilities. Its acceptance of existing collective bar-
gaining agreements stands in sharp contrast to Rock-
Tenn's tenacious opposition to organizing at its nonunion 
operations. 
With the help of the UPIU, workers at Rock-Tenn's 
Columbus, Indiana, facility began organizing in July 1989. 
The employer immediately responded with an aggressive 
antiunion campaign. Eight employees were discharged, 
union supporters were placed under surveillance, a no 
solicitation-no distribution rule was discriminatively en-
forced, employees were interrogated about their union 
sympathies, and management threatened to close the 
plant and reduce benefits. The union lost a February 1, 
1990 election 50-70. 
The UPIU filed numerous unfair labor practice (ULP) 
charges, and the NLRB issued complaints in October and 
December 1989, and March 1990. The three complaints 
were consolidated, along with union objections to the 
election. The board set a hearing date of April 18,1990. 
However, Rock-Tenn continued to harass and discrimi-
nate against union supporters. As additional charges 
against the company piled up, the board ordered the 
hearing rescheduled first to June 11, then to September 
10, and finally to December 10,1990. 
Frustrated by the delays, the workers and their union 
decided that it would be faster to file petitions for a sec-
ond vote (allowed one year after a union defeat) rather 
that to wait for an NLRB ruling. As the anniversary of the 
first election approached, the union withdrew its objec-
tions and settled the remaining ULP charges. 
The workers in Columbus began a new organizing 
drive and filed for a second election with signatures from 
a majority of employees. The employer's conduct did 
not change. Nonetheless, the union won a February 5, 
1991 election by a 78-57 vote and was certified as bar-
gaining agent on February 22. This was the UPIU's first 
organizing victory at an existing Rock-Tenn plant. 
Negotiations began on May 20,1991, three months 
after the second election and twenty months after the 
initial organizing effort. After fifteen sessions over the 
next five months, no agreement had been reached on 
any substantive issues. At negotiations on October 16, 
1991, Rock-Tenn announced that it had evidence that the 
union was no longer supported by a majority. The com-
pany then proposed that any contract should only last 
through February 22,1992. This bargaining stance was 
based on an NLRB decision that allows employers to "in-
sist on a contract duration coextensive with the certifica-
tion year.. .by showing that it had a reasonably based 
doubt as to the union's majority status." 
The UPIU decided to solicit membership cards to 
demonstrate that it still had majority support. On De-
cember 6 the union presented membership cards from 
65 percent of workers as proof. Rock-Tenn's lawyer 
Larry Forrester ignored the evidence and reiterated that 
the company would not accept a contract beyond Febru-
ary 22,1992, and that this was not a bargaining position. 
The company even refused the union's offer to have a 
neutral third party conduct a card check. 
Meanwhile, plant manager Roy Young had recruited 
employees Holly Trimble and Glenda Sowders to circu-
late a decertification petition. They had been allowed to 
move about through the plant during work time to solicit 
signatures. On December 10,Trimble and Sowders 
drove to Indianapolis in a company-provided car and 
filed a petition to decertify the UPIU. Both employees 
were paid for their time. However, the decertification 
petition was postponed indefinitely because the UPIU 
got wind of what happened and filed new ULP charges. 
The company immediately accelerated its antiunion 
tactics. When press operator Robbie Baker was called 
into his supervisor's office after an argument, he asked 
his union steward Cliff McCrory to go with him. In a 
blatant violation of Baker's legal right to have a steward 
present (known as Weingarten rights), McCrory was 
physically prevented from entering the office. The super-
visor warned him, "If I catch you off your job playing 
union steward, I will clock you out.. ..This union stuff is 
going to go." 
On another occasion, department head Bill Snyder 
told janitor Barbara Gruhl,"We have a majority of the 
people against the union and we're going to put a stop to 
it permanently.. ..Those that are causing all these prob-
lems are going to be severely punished." This was no idle 
threat. Shop steward William Schonfield received a writ-
ten warning for "standing around" on the first day he 
revealed his prounion sympathies by announcing his role 
as steward. A few weeks later he was suspended for 
"I'm tired of all this, and I tell you there's not going to 
be a union right now. We made sure of that, and we're 
going to put a stop to it permanently. Those that are 
causing all these problems are going to be severely 
punished, I'll see to it personally myself." 
Rock-Tenn department head Bill Snyder, 
ten months after workers voted for union 
representation and two weeks after 65 
percent of them signed a petition reaffirm-
ing their union support. 
three days after being reported for arguing by Trimble 
and Sowders (the employees who circulated the 
decertification petition). 
Local President Kathy Ellis was penalized for absen-
teeism for "union business" when she went to the NLRB 
Regional Office to answer a charge filed by the company. 
Later, she was disciplined for defending a long-time em-
ployee who was sent home early for a supposed quality 
control violation. 
And so it went. On May 25,1993, an administrative 
law judge (ALJ) decision rejected Rock-Tenn's claim that 
the union had lost its majority and found the company 
guilty of all of the unresolved violations mentioned 
above. These included violation of Weingarten rights and 
interfering with NLRB processes. Other than compen-
sating Schonfield and Ellis for their losses due to the dis-
crimination, the penalty recommended by the ALJ 
merely required Rock-Tenn to "cease and desist" from 
antiunion activity, to bargain in good faith, and to post a 
notice summarizing the NLRB order. 
These penalties are all that are allowed under the law, 
even in cases such as this in which the ALJ decried Rock-
Tenn's "widespread and long-continuing misconduct, 
demonstrating a general disregard for the employees' 
fundamental rights." Rock-Tenn's response was predict-
able. The company continued to delay dealing with the 
UPIU by utilizing the legal process. It filed an exception 
to the ALJ decision and appealed to the NLRB. • 
TEKSID ALUMINUM • 
Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers (ABCW) 
DICKSON, TENNESSEE 
WORKERS AT the Teksid Aluminum plant in Dickson, 
Tennessee, produce aluminum cylinder heads for auto-
mobile engines. Teksid is owned by Fiat, an Italian auto-
mobile company which is highly unionized in its home 
country. Fiat opened the plant at Dickson in 1987 and 
transferred management personnel from Italy to-direct 
the operation. 
In January 1989, the ABGW launched an organizing 
campaign with the assistance of the Industrial Union 
Department. The Italian managers responded with a ve-
hement antiunion effort which would eventually include 
numerous violations of the law. Their response is repre-
sentative of many foreign-owned companies, which 
work with unions at home but follow the American 
model of union busting in the United States. 
Teksid's effort to defeat the ABGW campaign was 
coordinated by Richard Figari, director of human re-
sources. Figari referred to workers who supported the 
ABGW as "union slime." In a series of captive audience 
meetings held the day after the organizing campaign 
went public, he expressed the company's firm opposi-
tion to unionization and his concern that "the hostility 
or the level of antagonism that is being created.. .at the 
plant is really not conducive to a good relationship with 
employees." 
The key targets of Figari's hostility were Bobby Felts, 
Steve Forcum, and Gary Johnson, leaders of the ABGW 
campaign. On separate occasions Felts and Forcum 
were told not to talk with other workers about the 
union. Felts and Johnson were forbidden to take breaks 
together. A new "no talking" rule was established, but 
only enforced against union supporters. Supervisors fol-
lowed Johnson and Felts into the break room, the locker 
room, and the parking lot. 
Two days after union supporters reported to work 
wearing union buttons, Figari circulated through the 
plant distributing antiunion buttons. When employee 
Randy Crowell declined an antiunion button because 
"I'm not campaigning either way," he was told to get a 
broom and sweep the basement. When he emerged cov-
ered with grime four hours later, his supervisor asked 
"Where's your union button?" and then laughed and 
walked away. 
The incident convinced Crowell to support the 
union, and he wore a button for the first time the next 
day. He then became a visible target of Teksid's union-
busting campaign. Figari used the firm's attendance 
policy as a ploy 
first to disci-
pline and ulti-
mately to dis-
charge this union sup-
porter. On one occasion 
Crowell was given a writ-
ten warning for missing 
work when he had to take his 
asthmatic two-year-old son to the 
hospital, even though he had notified 
his supervisor five hours before his 
shift started. Ten days later, Crowell 
was wearing a union hat when he went 
to Figari's office with a doctor's note 
recommending two weeks' light duty 
because of recurring wrist tendonitis. Figari threw down 
the note, said there was no light duty, sent Crowell 
home, and issued another written warning and a three-
day suspension. When Crowell missed another day be-
cause of legal problems in family court, he was fired, 
even though other workers had not been penalized for 
missing work under similar circumstances. 
While building the case to justify firing Randy 
Crowell, Teksid's Italian managers were also going after 
Steve Forcum. On March 16, just prior to the beginning 
of the 7:30 a.m. shift, Figari entered the break room. 
Forcum and two other union supporters questioned him 
regarding the thousands of dollars the company was 
spending on legal fees in their effort to "bust up the 
union campaign," rather than using such funds to pro-
vide added benefits for the workers. Figari responded 
directly to Forcum, "Steve, you won't be around here to 
enjoy any of the benefits anyway." 
Two weeks later Production Manager John Barbaro 
approached Forcum and asked to speak with him. He 
explained that production was down because of the 
"high tension" caused by the union campaign. After say-
ing,"! respect your rights to do what you're doing; we 
have unions in Italy," Barbaro asked Forcum to help get 
production back to former levels. When Forcum indi-
cated that he would continue to push for independent 
representation, Barbaro exploded, "I could lose my job, 
and if I go you go with me!" 
Supervisor Enzo Pagliuzzi also participated in Teksid's 
efforts to intimidate union supporters. Shortly after the 
campaign started, Pagliuzzi accused union supporter 
Many foreign owners of U.S. companies 
accept unions in their home countries but 
vigorously oppose organization efforts in 
their U.S. plants. 
Wade Ross of trying to run over him with a fork lift. 
Ross explained that the near accident had been caused 
by a defective horn, and Pagliuzzi ordered him to pre-
pare a written report. At the end of the shift Pagliuzzi 
entered the locker room and asked Ross for the report. 
Ross, who had changed out of his work clothes, had left 
the report in the fork lift, but Pagliuzzi would not let him 
retrieve it—first because he did not have his safety 
glasses and then because he was not wearing his work 
shoes. When a coworker got the form and brought it to 
Pagliuzzi ten feet from the locker room door, he refused 
to take it, demanding that Ross put on his glasses and 
shoes and personally deliver it. An argument ensued and 
Ross was suspended for five days. An NLRB judge later 
described the incident as "a classic case of provocation in 
order to induce a punishable response from a known 
union supporter." 
A few months into the campaign Bobby Dickens re-
ported to work wearing a union button. His supervisor 
pointed to the button and commented, "It looks like 
somebody shot off all over your shirt." Later in the shift a 
vocal antiunion employee reported to the same supervi-
sor that Dickens was trying to steal an inexpensive file 
(which he had placed in his back pocket while cleaning 
up his work site). Dickens was fired for theft. 
The ABGW filed for an election on June 26,1989, 
and a vote was scheduled for September 1. Teksid's anti-
union campaign continued, but it shifted away from at-
tacks on individual union supporters to more general 
warnings. For instance, a notice posted throughout the 
plant tided "The Truth About Negotiations" warned, "If 
the union should win the election, all policies and proce-
dures, including wages and benefits, will be frozen until 
there is an agreement reached.... Negotiations often last 
many, many months and in some cases years." 
In the final months before the voteTeksid President 
RiccardoTarantini got involved. In mid-August he held a 
private two-hour meeting in his office with John Harrell, 
an active union supporter and a "picture perfect" em-
ployee. After asking Harrell why he was wearing a union 
hat and button.Tarantini spent most of the meeting solic-
iting ideas for improvements in the plant. After thanking 
him for his suggestions, Tarantini said that he very much 
wanted Harrell to be part of the "team" and to advance in 
the company. 
Two days before the election Tarantini held a series of 
small group meetings with employees at which he read a 
prepared statement: "By now you should all understand 
that I am totally against the union... .You can vote for 
this union and make me negotiate against you, or you 
can vote against this union and help me shape Teksid 
into a team." 
The union lost the election 97-60 and subsequently 
filed numerous objections and unfair labor practice 
charges. Teksid continued to harass union supporters, 
leading to additional charges. One week after the vote 
Director of Human Resources Figari threatened to fire 
union supporter John McElhiney for marijuana use. After 
McElhiney denied the accusation, Figari blew up: "Stay 
away from the union and the NLRB, because if you go to 
them, I'm not kidding you, I'll smear your name so far in 
the papers that you'll never get another job." Over the 
next six weeks the three leaders of the union cam-
paign—Bobby Felts, Steve Forcum, and Gary Johnson— 
were all fired. 
A lengthy process of hearings and legal briefs eventu-
ally resulted in an administrative law judge (ALJ) decision 
more than two years later. On December 19,1991, 
Teksid was found guilty on almost all counts. The com-
pany appealed and another year and a half passed. Fi-
nally, on May 28,1993, the NLRB issued a decision up-
holding the ALJ. Other than correcting discriminatory 
treatment of eight employees (including reinstating four 
with back pay),Teksid's penalty was to post a notice 
agreeing to "cease and desist" from its unlawful antiunion 
activity. Ironically, the NLRB also ordered a new election 
and scheduled it for December 5,1993- However, the 
order was virtually meaningless since in the intervening 
four years all organizing committee members had quit or 
been fired, and the union had little support among the 
workers in the face of the company's demonstrated abil-
ity to ignore the law The ABGW eventually withdrew 
from the election. • 
FLEX CABLE AND FURNACE PRODUCTS • 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) 
MORLEY, MICHIGAN 
WHEN OWNER Richard Balaguer moved Flex Cable and 
Furnace Products from Grand Rapids, Michigan, to the 
small town of Morley fifty miles away, he was praised by 
town leaders for providing jobs and for his financial do-
nation toward a new community park. However, the 
workers he hired soon found Balaguer to be a less than 
desirable boss with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude. In the 
spring of 1991 a group of workers contacted the UAW 
with complaints of poor wages and benefits, and sexual 
harassment of women employees by male supervisors. 
The workers had approached the union in spite of 
prior warnings from plant manager Ed Schultz that the 
plant would close if they ever tried to organize. He had 
explained that Balaguer moved to Morley from Grand 
Rapids in order to escape a union that represented work-
ers at that facility. In May when Balaguer and Schultz 
caught wind of the fact that the twenty employees were 
discussing joining a union, they threatened to close the 
Morley plant as well. On May 24, the Friday of Memorial 
Day weekend, Balaguer instructed all of the employees 
to stop working fifteen minutes before the end of the 
shift. He called them outside and had them watch as he 
padlocked the door, announcing that the plant was 
closed and that they were all terminated. 
The following morning a help-wanted ad appeared in 
the local newspaper for positions immediately available 
beginning Tuesday, May 28. Over the course of the holi-
day weekend, eleven of the twenty workers terminated 
on Friday were telephoned and told to report to work 
the following Tuesday. The nine employees suspected of 
being involved with union activity were not invited to 
return. The plant resumed operation without interrup-
tion on the 28th. 
If there were any questions about the bogus nature of 
the "plant closing," they were answered a few weeks 
later when the Morley Village Council unanimously ap-
proved a twelve-year tax abatement for Flex Cable. At 
the July 8 meeting Balaguer announced that employment 
at the factory had risen to twenty-nine, and he predicted 
that by the end of 1992 the company would employ 
nearly fifty. 
The UAW filed charges with the NLRB, which de-
cided to issue a complaint and schedule a hearing. In 
response, Flex Cable agreed to reinstate three people 
effective July 9, but at reduced benefit levels and as pro-
bationary employees. The employer also eliminated fam-
ily coverage from its health insurance plan for all work-
ers. At a meeting of plant employees on July 19 Schultz 
announced a new rule prohibiting anyone from wearing 
a union hat or pin; foreman Don Brocker pointed to 
Teresa Utter and Dave Reichard who were wearing UAW 
Organizing Committee buttons and said, "That means 
you." 
On January 2,1992, seven months after the plant was 
closed and union supporters terminated, the NLRB nego-
tiated a settlement agreement with Flex Cable. The nine 
discharged workers received various amounts of back 
pay totalling over $31,000. However, all but two waived 
reinstatement. Health insurance benefits were returned 
to former levels for all employees. But the unionization 
effort was destroyed. 
As UAW International Representative Ken Bieber ob-
served, "The company killed the workers' organizing 
attempt before it ever had a chance to really develop.... 
To the workers involved it appeared that this employer 
was not afraid of the NLRB or the law. By the time the 
NLRB settlement was posted in the plant we had no 
support left." • 
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This ad appeared the day after the company 
owner "closed" the factory in reaction to his 
workers' efforts to organize. 
WINDSOR HOUSE, O'BRIEN MEMORIAL, AND CARRINGTON SOUTH 
• Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO 
"People are being treated like dogs. People need to 
realize that they have choices and they have voices. 
When they band together, anything is possible." 
CHRISTINA jACON KLARIC 
Practical nurse, Windsor House 
"f-
Worker enthusiasm for independent repre-
sentation incensed employers, generating 
a coordinated response from nursing homes 
in the Youngstown area against union 
representation. 
THERE ARE approximately eighty-five nursing homes in 
the area around Youngstown. In response to workers' 
requests, SEIU Local 627 has been actively organizing 
employees of the nursing homes since 1990. The local 
has established the Coalition for Better Care to coordi-
nate community support for the organizing efforts. In 
reaction against their workers' interest in unionization 
and the SEIU's organizing success, nursing home owners 
have joined together to wage war against Local 627 with 
the aid of antiunion law firms. One NLRB agent said of 
the situation, "What happened in this region in the steel 
industry in the 1930s, is now happening in the nursing 
home industry in the 1990s." 
In November 1990, the SEIU filed for election for 
a unit of 132 service and maintenance employees and 
licensed practical nurses (LPNs) at Windsor House, part 
of a chain of nursing homes owned by John Masternick. 
The employer's legal challenges to the makeup of the 
unit were rejected, and Local 627 won the February 27, 
1991 election by seven votes. Windsor House first filed 
objections to union conduct during the preelection pe-
riod, then appealed when the NLRB regional director 
found the objections without merit and certified the 
union as bargaining agent. 
By the summer of 1991, the game plan of John 
Masternick and the lawyers representing Windsor House 
was becoming obvious—manipulate the legal process 
by pursuing every possible challenge and appeal to delay 
dealing with the union and avoid bargaining. A hearing 
was scheduled on the employer's appeal, but at the last 
minute the Windsor House attorneys filed for a post-
ponement. When the November 15,1991 hearing 
officer's report went against the company, exceptions 
were filed. Eventually, the NLRB ruled against the 
employer's exceptions and upheld the certification of 
Local 627 on November 30,1992. 
When the SEIU contacted Masternick to schedule 
negotiations, he refused to bargain on the grounds that 
the original unit determination was inappropriate be-
cause the LPNs were grouped with other employees. 
This forced the union to file unfair labor practice (ULP) 
charges for failure to bargain. On March 10,1993, the 
NLRB issued a bargaining order, but Windsor House re-
fused to comply. In response the NLRB sought enforce-
ment in federal appeals court. During the four years of 
legal delays there was a near total turnover in the 
workforce at Windsor House. 
While the legal battle dragged on against Windsor 
House, SEIU Local 627 was organizing workers at other 
nursing homes in the area. One of them was O'Brien 
Memorial in Masury, Ohio, also owned by John 
Masternick. The employer's campaign against the union 
included the standard themes—unions are third parties, 
union dues and fees are excessive and unnecessary, and 
unions will take you out on strike. But there was an-
other more important theme directly tied to the 
company's legal maneuvering in the Windsor House 
case. A May 1992 letter from Masternick to O'Brien em-
ployees explained the situation in detail: 
There are some very important things you 
should know about this union. Way back in Oc-
tober 1990 this exact same union organizer— 
Debbie Timko—attempted to unionize employ-
ees at our sister facility Windsor House, with 
the exact same promises they are now making 
to you. After almost two years, there is still no 
union contract in place at Windsor House. In 
fact, because of different legal cases that are 
pending, the company and the union have not 
yet even started to negotiate. 
Thus the employer was cynically manipulating the 
National Labor Relations Act in one case, then blaming 
the union for failing to deliver in an effort to convince 
workers in another campaign that organizing is fruitless. 
In spite of Masternick's carefully crafted strategy, the 
SEIU won the election at O'Brien on August 26,1992, by 
a margin of 88-60 for a 180-member unit of service and 
maintenance workers and LPNs. The employer fired a 
total of thirteen workers for participating in the organiz-
ing campaign. The union reached a voluntary settlement 
of these discharges prior to a scheduled NLRB hearing. 
Following the pattern of legal evasion utilized in the 
Windsor case, O'Brien Memorial filed thirteen objections 
to the election. Included in the objections were two 
that almost always lead to a hearing (and attendant de-
lays) because of their serious nature. One accused the 
union of "creating an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, 
and coercion"; the other alleged that the union made 
anti-Semitic remarks prior to the election. The NLRB 
regional director specifically addressed the charges of 
anti-Semitism in a January 15,1993 decision. He noted 
that the only relevant evidence offered by O'Brien was 
"one isolated cartoon" in a union newsletter "which de-
picts a meeting conducted by the employer in a 'Gestapo 
Meeting Hall' with employees chained to their chairs." 
Obviously puzzled by the argument that this cartoon was 
an anti-Semitic appeal to racial prejudice, the regional 
director dismissed the objection. 
The NLRB agreed with the regional director's deci-
sion to throw out eleven of the objections (including the 
alleged anti-Semitism) and ordered a hearing on the re-
maining two. In an August 2,1993 decision, the hearing 
officer rejected the employer's claims that the union 
used fear, intimidation, and coercion. The three wit-
nesses for O'Brien were antiunion activists who had "at-
tended union organizing meetings for the purpose of 
voicing opposition to the union." They attempted to 
twist union warnings that the employer would retaliate 
against union supporters, interpreting them as threats 
that the union would retaliate against union opponents. 
The hearing officer described their testimony as "biased, 
lacking reliability, nonresponsive, evasive, argumentative, 
selective, and inconsistent." In effect, they fabricated 
threats in order to assist the employer in its litigation 
aimed at avoiding the union. O'Brien, of course, ap-
pealed the decision. 
While fighting the SEIU in court, John Masternick 
joined with other nursing home owners and antiunion 
law firms to conduct seminars titled, literally, "How to 
Keep Debbie Timko and the Service Employees Interna-
tional Union out of Your Home." The seminars were 
conducted by John Masternick and Mary Jane Jones, the 
administrator of Opportunity Homes which was orga-
nized by Local 627 in 1992. The two law firms involved 
in the seminars were Joondeph and Shaffer from Akron 
and Duvin, Cahn and Bernard from Cleveland. Two semi-
nars were held, one in Columbia County and the other at 
the corporate offices of Windsor House in Gerard, Ohio. 
Carrington South is one of the nursing homes that has 
participated in the coordinated management campaigns 
to resist organizing by SEIU Local 627. In response to 
workers' strong interest, the SEIU began organizing at 
Carrington South in the spring of 1993. An election was 
scheduled for June 3,1993, for a unit of 116 service and 
maintenance workers. 
Consistent with the coordinated employer strategy, 
Carrington filed a blocking charge on June 1 based on 
the appearance of a union picket sign at a press confer-
From CARRINGTON'S CORNER June 21,1993 
"We've got some difficult days ahead. But it 
really doesn't matter with me now. Because I've 
been to the mountain top. Like anybody I 
would like to live a long life. Longevity has its 
place.... But I'm not concerned about that 
now.... 
And He's allowed me to go up to the mountain. 
And I've looked over, and I've seen the Prom-
ised Land. I may not get there with you, but I 
want you to know tonight that we as a people 
will get to the Promised Land. 
So I'm happy tonight. I'm not worried about 
anything. I'm not fearing any man. 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
April 3,1968 
ence. The regional office of the NLRB facilitated the 
employer's tactical delay by postponing the election with 
minimal investigation of the facts. The charges subse-
quently were dismissed and an election was held Septem-
ber 9- The SEIU won with a clear and uncontested 
majority. 
Carrington South filed objections, alleging that the 
union's organizing campaign made inflammatory appeals 
to racial prejudice. Specifically, the employer argued 
that the union appealed to the racial prejudice of black 
employees against white employees. This claim was 
made in spite of the fact that all of the union staff mem-
bers who worked on the campaign are white. 
The only evidence cited to support this claim that 
actually dealt with the union's campaign conduct re-
ferred to four copies of the union newsletter 
"Carrington's Corner." Specifically, Carrington's lawyers 
presented three cartoons and one quote. Only one of the 
cartoons included caricatures that were racially identifi-
able: it depicted a black employee confronting a white 
supervisor. The quote in question was from Martin 
Luther King's famous "I've been to the mountain top" 
speech. 
In his rejection of Carrington's case, the NLRB re-
gional director noted that the union distributed twenty-
three pieces of literature during the campaign. He con-
cluded: "It is clear that the three cartoons in question and 
the quotation from Dr. Martin Luther King are not objec-
tionable, and it is also clear that the union did not con-
Searching desparately for any reason to 
challenge the vote in favor of union repre-
sentation at Carrington South, the nursing 
home's lawyers argued that this quote 
from Martin Luther King was used in an 
"inflammatory appeal to racial prejudice." 
duct a campaign in which race was a significant aspect." 
Carrington's appeal to the NLRB was denied. 
Given the weakness of the employer's charges, it ap-
pears that the only rationale for pursuing them was to 
provide a legalistic basis to delay certification in order to 
frustrate the workers' efforts to attain union representa-
tion. The charge of racial prejudice is a serious enough 
one that both the NLRB and the courts are likely to take 
it seriously regardless of the merits. 
The parallel between the racial discrimination 
charges at Carrington South and the anti-Semitism 
charges at O'Brien Memorial is obvious. It should come 
as no surprise that Mary Jane Jones, who joined with 
O'Brien owner John Masternick in the anti-SEIU seminars 
described above, was subsequently hired by Carrington 
South to coordinate its antiunion campaign. The lawyer 
representing Carrington before the NLRB and the courts 
is David Shaffer of the firm Joondeph and Shaffer, and 
another participant in the seminars. 
When Local 627 asked Carrington to bargain, the re-
sponse was predictable. Letters from David Shaffer and 
from Carrington declined the requests. As explained 
clearly in a February 22,1994 letter from Carrington, 
"The company filed objections... based on the fact that 
the union had made an appeal to racial prejudices... .The 
company believes that the rulings by the NLRB were 
wrong. The only way we can test the correctness of the 
NLRB ruling is to refuse to bargain so that the matter will 
be put into the court system." 
While Carrington continues-to fight Local 627 
through the courts, Windsor Home and O'Brien finally 
have abandoned their attempt to avoid bargaining. 
Cases for both Windsor and O'Brien are currently pend-
ing before the U.S. Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit; 
with a negative decision inevitable, however, the em-
ployer decided to negotiate. Collective bargaining was 
in progress as of July 1994. Though the union has been 
vindicated, the four-year delay at Windsor and two-year 
delay at O'Brien have denied workers (many of whom 
have moved on to other jobs) their rights to union repre-
sentation. More important, the ongoing battle at 
Carrington reflects how coordination among employers 
and attorneys has spread the union-busting cancer 
throughout the nursing home community in theYoung-
stown area. • 
LABOR LAW AS A TOOL FOR EMPLOYERS 
ANOTHER REASON NOT TO SIGN A CARD 
QUESTION: DOES HAVING A UNION 
MEAN MY PAY CAN'T 
GO DOWN? 
ANSWER: NO 
HERE'S THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
LAW: 
***THERE IS, OF COURSE NO OBLIGATION ON 
THE PART OF AN EMPLOYER TO CONTRACT TO 
CONTINUE ALL EXISTING BENEFITS, NOR IS IT AN 
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE TO OFFER REDUCED 
BENEFITS." 
This flyer distributed by Lundy's packing 
is representative of employers' use of labor 
law to disparage the value of independent 
representation. 
L abor laws do not protect effectively the rights of workers, and this is cause for concern. Even more distressing is the ease with which management lawyers can manipulate the le-
gal process that is supposed to protect workers, turning 
it to the advantage of the employer. Most deplorable is 
the use of federal court and NLRB interpretations of la-
bor law as weapons to obstruct workers' efforts to exer-
cise their rights. 
Delays inherent in the NLRB process offer obvious 
advantages to employers. The options begin as soon as 
the union petitions for an election. The employer can 
delay the vote by refusing to accept the unit specified by 
the union, which will force a unit determination hear-
ing. The employer can prolong the hearing process by 
presenting detailed evidence and testimony. Delays at 
this early stage allow the employer to prepare and set in 
motion an antiunion campaign. Even a few weeks delay 
can allow the employer's intimidation tactics to take 
hold and shift the momentum away from the union. 
At the election the employer can challenge all voters 
who conceivably could be construed to fall outside the 
unit. In the case of a close vote, these challenges can 
delay certification for months, allowing for hearings, le-
gal briefs, an original decision, and appeals. 
If the union wins the election, the employer has avail-
able a range of delay options. Objections to the original 
unit determination can be raised. Alternatively, unfair 
labor practice (ULP) charges can be filed related to union 
conduct during the preelection period or on the day of 
the vote. In some cases, the conduct of a board agent 
during the vote may be the basis for an appeal. Employ-
ers can even tie up a case by raising issues that deal ex-
clusively with NLRB procedures. 
Once the union is certified, the employer can refuse 
to bargain, thereby forcing the union to file a ULP 
charge. This will allow the employer to raise again in 
federal court any objection that was denied by the NRLB 
regarding unit determination, union conduct, or board 
procedures. 
Wear the Union Label... 
UNEMPLOYED 
"^ m 
When workers at Crowley and Jennings 
Manufacturing attempted to form a union, 
the company hung a twelve-by-three-foot 
banner with this message inside the factory. 
Another huge banner proclaimed "Vote 
No—Save Your Job." Without a hearing, the 
NLRB determined that these banners did not 
threaten job loss or plant closing but were 
expressions of "employer free speech." 
In fact, the tactic of openly committing ULPs to get 
the union to file charges can be used at any stage in the 
process, since ULP filings almost always cause postpone-
ments of hearings to allow for consolidation of all pend-
ing issues related to a case. 
The cases collected by the IUD include examples of 
all of these types of delays. With the help of experienced 
attorneys, strong-willed employers can delay bargaining 
for years. In one instance workers first voted for a union 
in 1964. The case has bounced back and forth from the 
NLRB to the federal courts and even went all the way to 
the Supreme Court in 1974. Thirty years later it is still 
tied up in litigation, and the workers still have no inde-
pendent voice. 
In recent years employers have used the possibility of 
delay as a campaign theme to discourage workers from 
supporting a union. Verbal threats may be delivered to 
the work force in captive audience meetings or spelled 
out carefully in letters to employees or flyers distributed 
in the workplace. Some companies have pursued all pos-
sible appeals in one facility, then reported the delays as 
evidence of union weakness in organizing campaigns at 
other locations. 
Although delays are the most obvious manifestation 
of how employers can abuse the union representation 
process, there are other ways the process can assist em-
ployers who wish to evade unions. One option is to 
change contractors or sell the business, perhaps under 
the protection of bankruptcy court. Depending on how 
the transfer is handled and on the status of the represen-
tation proceedings, union certification may be with-
drawn or denied. Another is to pursue groundless 
charges against the union, possibly based on fabricated 
evidence. 
The cases in this section touch on many of the meth-
ods used by employers to wrest advantage from the 
NLRB process. Examples of delays of various types, 
threats of delay, fabrication of evidence, and the NLRB's 
successorship doctrine are all included. 
HARPERCOLLINS Lawyers for HarperCollins dragged 
out unit determination hearings for eight days. A five-
month delay from the union petition to the election al-
lowed the company's "liberal" managers to gain control 
of the situation with a powerful antiunion campaign. 
The delays also allowed for a series of personnel moves, 
including hiring eleven new employees who then voted 
in the election. 
FOUNTAIN VALLEY This employer took advantage of 
every delay option: the unit was contested, delaying the 
election; voters were challenged, delaying certification; 
and certification was appealed, delaying the start of ne-
gotiations. Fountain Valley then used evasive bargaining 
to stall negotiations and ultimately filed a ULP against the 
union as an excuse to renege on a negotiated agreement. 
CROWN CORK AND SEAL This unionized employer vig-
orously opposed organizing in Puerto Rico. A letter to 
employees spelled out legal appeals options, stated 
openly that the company would pursue those options, 
and suggested years of possible delays. 
DAYTON HUDSON'S This company filed legal appeals to 
postpone bargaining with a union at one store, then used 
the delays as antiunion campaign fodder when workers 
at another store attempted to organize. In support of a 
complex legal challenge to the union's preelection con-
duct, the company fabricated evidence and then had the 
gall to attack the union for not respecting the law. 
CHOSUN DAILY NEWS This Korean employer's open vio-
lations of the law prompted a bargaining order from the 
NLRB in spite of a tie vote. To avoid the practical impact 
of the order, the employer reduced employment dramati-
cally and then transferred ownership to another Korean 
contractor, which returned the work force to prior lev-
els. Under NLRB successorship policy, this maneuver 
created a new bargaining unit and the bargaining order 
was rescinded. • 
HARPERCOLLINS • 
Communications Workers of America (CWA) 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 
HARPERCOLLINS in San Francisco, owned by Rupert 
Murdoch, publishes psychology, feminist, and religious 
books. Half of the 150 highly educated employees are 
eligible for union membership, 80 percent of them 
women. The majority of the jobs require college 
degrees. 
In 1990, out of a growing frustration with their work-
ing conditions, fifty employees founded what was called 
the Non-Management Group. The group met once a 
week during the lunch hour in the company conference 
room and issued memos requesting resolution of person-
nel problems. In response, the company set up several 
task forces to look into the problem areas. The task 
forces, made up of management and nonmanagement 
employees, met for months and submitted lengthy rec-
ommendations. Some small improvements were made. 
For example, the medical plan was changed so that the 
employees could have a pap smear and an eye examina-
tion in the same year and have both covered. Months of 
work on the task forces and lengthy recommendations 
produced very little change. The workers soon realized 
they had no more voice in the decision-making process 
than they had before. 
The workers concluded that if they wanted their con-
cerns taken seriously, they would need independent rep-
resentation by a union. They invited several unions to 
come and talk with them and eventually selected CWA. 
In the fall of 1992, the workers held their first organizing 
meeting with CWA. The union organizer distributed a 
pamphlet that outlined typical things employers do to 
fight workers' attempts to form a union. Gina Hyams, 
who emerged as a rank-and-file leader during the cam-
paign, remembers the employees' reactions to the 
union's pamphlet: "Naively we thought, almost all our 
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"The publisher's main claim to fame is its 
line of New Age and recovery books,... 
[with an] emphasis on self-help.... Late last 
year, three quarters of Harper's non-man-
agement employees authorized Communi-
cations Workers of America Local 9410 to 
win them a union contract.... HarperCollins 
CEO George Craig said, 'The company con-
siders this nothing short of war. We'll fight 
this at every turn. You're disloyal and naive 
for doing this.'...'It was an education, sighs 
[union supporter] Gina Hyams. *We 
thought it would all work out, like the self-
help book says."' While profiting from the 
sale of self-help books, HarperCollins vigor-
ously resisted its own employees' efforts at 
self-organization. 
bosses are liberal Democrats; the company's profits come 
from publishing tons of progressive self-help books; if we 
decide to form a union, our management will just recog-
nize that we're helping ourselves and they'll be civil and 
sit down and fairly negotiate a reasonable contract. We 
were wrong." 
On December 18,1992, CWA filed an NLRB petition 
for a unit of 83 employees (62 signed the petition). 
HarperCollins sought to exclude 20 employees from the 
unit (CWA agreed to 4). The NLRB held eight days of 
hearing in January and February, 1993. The hearings 
were prolonged by management lawyers who, for ex-
ample, questioned a receptionist about her duties for 
three hours. The NLRB ultimately ruled with the union 
and included all 16 contested employees in the unit. 
However the decision was not issued until May 28 with 
the election scheduled for June 18. 
During the intervening months the company imple-
mented a standard union resistance campaign. Letters 
were sent to all employees at home, one signed by Vice 
President Clayton Carlson opposing "the insertion of an 
outside factor like CWA"; another was signed by all man-
agers arguing that unionization "would not serve to pro-
mote cooperation and solidarity." CEO George Craig 
flew in from New York and held captive audience meet-
ings. He declared "this is war," labeled as "disloyal" all 
employees involved in the campaign, then hinted that 
HarperCollins did not need to stay in San Francisco. 
Craig also promised that he would negotiate with an in-
house association if employees dropped "the union 
bullshit." 
Beginning in March the company made a series of 
personnel changes. Joanne Moschella and Erich Metting-
Van Rijn were promoted out of the unit. Monica Baltz, 
Julie Wunderlich, Dawn Balzarano, and Gina Hyams were 
laid off. Balzarano was a vocal union supporter, and the 
other five were on the organizing committee. Eleven 
new employees were hired while the unit determination 
was being litigated, and all were allowed to vote in the 
election. 
The aggressive resistance campaign succeeded. The 
CWA lost the June 18 election 31 to 36 with 4 ballots 
challenged. On August 31 the NLRB issued a complaint 
against HarperCollins on twelve violations charged by 
the union, including the threats and promises voiced by 
CEO Craig and other managers, and the four termina-
tions. A hearing originally scheduled for May 17,1994, 
was moved up to December 1993 after CWA and key 
elected officials questioned the lengthy delay. It was 
later postponed to February 14,1994. As of Labor Day 
1994, the workers who supported the CWA were still 
waiting for a decision. 
Regardless of the outcome of the NLRB hearings, it is 
unlikely that the workers at HarperCollins will secure the 
union representation that 75 percent of them requested 
when they signed the CWA petition in 1992. The com-
pany effectively used legal delays to buy time and attack 
the union's base of support. Looking back at the organiz-
ing experience Gina Hyams recalls, "I lost my job. I was 
very, very upset and afraid. It's a scary thing to lose a job 
in this economy. I felt many emotions but I did not re-
gret what I had done....The law says that union organiz-
ing is supposed to be a protected activity, but I can tell 
you from my personal experience that this protection is 
basically meaningless." • 
FOUNTAIN VALLEY REGIONAL HOSPITAL • 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 
FOUNTAIN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA 
Frustrated by legal delays, professional 
employees picket to ask Fountain Valley to 
negotiate in good faith. 
IN MAY 1986, the United Nurses Association of California 
(UNAC, now affiliated with AFSCME) was contacted by 
registered nurses and other professional employees at 
Fountain Valley Regional Hospital. Fountain Valley is a 
large doctor-owned hospital in the politically conserva-
tive Orange County. A six-month organizing campaign 
gained 520 authorization cards from a unit of 650 (80 
percent). 
UNAC filed for an election on November 18,1986, 
and the delays began. The hospital demanded a hearing 
on the makeup of the unit and presented multiple chal-
lenges, insisting that a wide variety of technical, manage-
ment, and confidential employees be excluded. The 
hearing stretched over eight days in December 1986 and 
January 1987. The NLRB issued its decision on the unit 
on April 1,1987, and scheduled the election for April 30 
and May 1. 
Hospital management used the five-and-one-half-
month delay to implement a heavy antiunion campaign 
replete with the standard threats, promises, and captive 
audience meetings. Two days before the election the 
director of nursing walked through the facility accompa-
nied by an armed guard. She claimed that she had re-
ceived threatening calls from union officials. 
The campaign was coordinated by West Coast Indus-
trial Relations Association, an openly antiunion consult-
ing firm known for its "Maintaining Your Union Free Sta-
tus" seminars. Based on papers filed by WCIRA with the 
U.S. Department of Labor, Fountain Valley paid over 
$365,000 for union avoidance assistance during the first 
year of its battle with UNAC. 
The election results were 278 for UNAC, 274 for no 
union with 28 challenged ballots (24 by the employer, 4 
by the union). Hearings, legal briefs, appeals, and admin-
istrative delays chewed up a year and a half before the 
ballots were opened and counted. Finally in October 
1988 the union was declared winner with a final count 
of 285 to 279- Fountain Valley refused to accept the re-
sults, appealed the decision to the federal courts, and 
refused to bargain, claiming that the union did not repre-
sent a majority of employees. 
In fact, throughout the process of determining the 
election outcome, the hospital continued its antiunion 
Your Union 
Working for You! 
Fountain Valley Regional Medical Center fired a 
health care professional while she was on medical 
disability leave. 
She was on leave because of an injury that occurred 
while performing her duties in the hospital. 
I'M THi BOSS ^^^BS> 
She is a professional with 10 years of loyal and 
dedicated service to the hospital. 
This health care professional contacted UNAC. The 
union filed a complaint on her behalf. 
The Union got this dedicated 
professional her job back. 
As this March 1993 flyer conveys, the professional employees' or-
ganization at Fountain Valley continued to defend the rights of its 
members in spite of seven years with no contract. 
campaign prompting numerous unfair labor practice 
(ULP) charges. In January 1989 union activist Patricia 
Neal was fired. In addition, a series of charges piled up 
as Fountain Valley unilaterally changed conditions of em-
ployment while refusing to bargain with the workers' 
representative. Among the unilateral changes were in-
stalling a new "performance based" pay system, replacing 
bargaining unit employees with student nurses, imple-
menting a two-tier wage structure, changing the method 
of assigning shift work, adopting new attendance rules, 
and reducing medical benefits. 
A series of bargaining orders were ignored, which 
forced the NLRB to seek enforcement by the U.S. Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Finally on June 12,1991, forty-
eight months after the professional employees at Foun-
tain Valley voted to be represented by UNAC, the court 
ordered the hospital to bargain. 
Over the next twenty months, bargaining sessions 
were held once per month and progress was painfully 
slow. Lawyer Timothy Ryan and Human Resources Direc-
tor Steve Luick represented Fountain Valley. They would 
attend, but they were not prepared to bargain seriously. 
At the typical negotiating session the union team would 
present a detailed proposal, then Ryan and Luick would 
either reject it with no counterproposal, or promise to 
respond at the next session. At the next meeting they 
would say that they "forgot" to check with top manage-
ment or "forgot" to collect the information necessary to 
reply. 
Finally on April 12,1993, agreement was reached 
when the UNAC resigned itself to accepting the status 
quo on most outstanding issues. Unbeknownst to the 
union, a decertification petition had been filed two days 
earlier. Union members ratified the contract on April 16, 
but Ryan and Luick refused to sign it. They claimed that 
the union had breached the agreement by circulating a 
flyer announcing that the UNAC had helped a profes-
sional employee get her job back after she was fired 
while on disability leave. The hospital filed a ULP charge 
against the union in an obvious move to invent a legal 
rationale for not signing the contract. 
In the meantime, ULPs continued to pile up against 
Fountain Valley. First the hospital openly refused the le-
gal right of Sandra Iyer to be represented by the union 
during a grievance hearing concerning her discharge 
(the right to be represented during disciplinary hearings 
is known as "Weingarten rights").Then the NLRB reached 
a settlement with Fountain Valley that required the hospi-
tal to post a notice that it would no longer deny 
Weingarten rights. In direct violation of the posted 
settlement, the hospital informed the UNAC that it would 
not proceed with the grievance unless Iyer agreed to 
meet without the union as her representative. 
On December 30,1993, the NLRB Region 21 issued a 
complaint against Fountain Valley on numerous ULP 
charges, including violation of Iyer's Weingarten rights, 
violation of the settlement agreement regarding 
Weingarten rights, failure to bargain in good faith, and 
failure to abide by the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement accepted by the union the preceding April. A 
hearing was held on June 28,1994. 
Fountain Valley Hospital has made a mockery of the 
NLRB process. Legal challenges and delays have been 
used at every step to deny professional employees of the 
hospital their right to engage in collective action. 
Complementing the delays, the hospital has waged a 
nonstop antiunion campaign for eight years and has vio-
lated NLRB orders with virtual impunity. • 
CROWN CORK AND SEAL • 
United Steelworkers of America (USWA) 
SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO 
THE USWA has thirty-six union contracts with Crown 
Cork and Seal for plants in the United States and Canada, 
with a good bargaining relationship. Nonetheless, the 
company vigorously opposed USWA attempts to organize 
workers at its Puerto Rico facility in 1990-92. 
Conditions at the Crown Cork and Seal plant in 
Puerto Rico were far below the standards at mainland 
United States and Canadian facilities. In a 1990 NLRB 
election the USWA lost to an independent union by three 
votes. The USWA protested the election based on the 
employer's assistance to the independent. Within a few 
months, the leaders of the independent union decided to 
support affiliation with the USWA. 
In March 1991, with a clear majority signed to autho-
rization cards, the USWA petitioned for a new election. 
The NLRB directed an election, but Crown Cork and Seal 
appealed, claiming that the independent union still rep-
resented the workers. While the appeal was pending, 
the company implemented an aggressive attack on the 
USWA. On the condition that workers retain the inde-
pendent union, management offered pay increases, bo-
nuses, extra vacation time, and improved insurance cov-
erage. The company also made threats explicitly tied to 
legal delays. 
A lengthy December 11,1991 memo sent to each 
worker at home included the following in a "List of Facts" 
(translated from Spanish): 
5. The company has prepared unfair labor prac-
tice charges for the NLRB.... The hearing can 
go before a judge at anytime in 1992. The judge 
can issue a decision between two and twelve 
months. Either party can appeal....The Board 
can reasonably issue a decision between two 
months and two years. Either party can ap-
peal. ... It can reasonably take between six 
months and eighteen months for the Court of 
Appeals to issue a decision. Either party can 
appeal.... 
6. .. .If there is an election and the Steelworkers 
win, the company would have the legal right to 
challenge....The company would challenge the 
results This means that the company would 
nullify the need to negotiate with the USWA. 
7. If the USWA does not like the company's re-
fusal to negotiate it would have to file ULP 
charges—the company would appeal to the 
"First, this outside union has filed charges against the 
company with the NLRB...The company is currently 
meeting with an NLRB investigator...Unfortunately, we 
have started on the road of a very, very long process. 
Our attorneys have advised us that generally the steps 
involve: an investigation, a possible trial, a possible ap-
peal to an NLRB panel in Washington, DC, and even a 
possible appeal to a Federal Appellate Court. There is 
no way to know how long this process could go on, but 
many cases have lasted five, six, or seven years." 
This message was distributed by BMP America to its employees 
during a campaign for union representation. It is remarkably simi-
lar to the one used by Crown, Cork and Seal in an attempt to 
discourage its employees from affiliating with the Steelworkers. 
NLRB and the Court of Appeals. This process 
could take two years or more.... 
9. In a period of three years, the final salary 
offer that the company made [to the indepen-
dent union] would have resulted in an addi-
tional $6,240 for each employee.... 
In essence, the company blatantly admitted that it 
was using NLRB procedures to avoid dealing with the 
USWA, and it used a description of those procedures as 
antiunion propaganda. Faced with the company's threat 
to delay, the USWA chose not to rely on the NLRB. In-
stead coordinated campaign tactics were used to disrupt 
productivity at unionized Crown Cork and Seal facilities 
on the U.S. mainland. Responding to this pressure, the 
company ultimately chose to end its opposition and rec-
ognize the USWA as bargaining agent at the San Juan fa-
cility. Crown Cork and Seal's Puerto Rico employees 
won union representation and achieved notable improve-
ments in wages and working conditions, but all gains 
came outside of NLRB procedures and in spite of the 
company's use of weaknesses in the law as part of its 
union avoidance propaganda. • 
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DAYTON HUDSON'S DEPARTMENT STORE COMPANY • 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) 
DEARBORN, PONTIAC, AND WESTLAND, MICHIGAN 
IN FEBRUARY 1990 the UAW initiated an organizing cam-
paign at Dayton Hudson's Detroit area department stores. 
The campaign was met by bitter employer opposition, 
with President Dennis Toffolo calling UAW officials cheat-
ers and liars and proclaiming, "Hudson's is unequivocally 
opposed to unionization and will fight all such attempts." 
In spite of the company's rigid stance, there have been 
four NLRB elections at three stores. 
The first election was held at the Westland Mall store 
in Westland, Michigan. The UAW won the May 11,1990 
vote by a 274 to 179 margin. According to activist Mary 
Flowers, the workers voted for independent representa-
tion because "We were tired of being treated like kinder-
gartners. We had no dignity." Dayton Hudson's issued 
a statement: "We naturally wish this vote would have 
been otherwise, but we respect the process" (emphasis 
added). The company's respect for the process evidently 
included the right to appeal, because it challenged the 
election results before the NLRB. The NLRB found no 
merit in Dayton Hudson's objections and certified the 
union on December 26, 1990. 
Although in the immediate aftermath of the vote Day-
ton Hudson's had promised to meet the union at the bar-
gaining table once it was certified, the company recanted 
its promise and refused to bargain. Toffolo explained, 
"We're exercising our right to due process of law." This 
legal maneuver forced the UAW to file an unfair labor 
practice (ULP) charge. The NLRB agreed with the UAW 
and ordered Dayton Hudson's to bargain. 
Rather than comply with the order, the company filed 
new challenges to the election, claiming to have discov-
ered evidence that the union had forged authorization 
cards. The company did not suggest that the union had 
filed for an election with insufficient valid cards, but 
rather that the union had used the forged cards to create 
the appearance that the campaign had broad support in 
order to build momentum. To substantiate their claim 
they presented a signed statement from John Medgwick, 
a former union activist who had defected. The NLRB dis-
missed the charges without a hearing, noting that the 
company had produced no evidence that the alleged 
forged cards had been used to generate support for the 
union. Dayton Hudson's appealed the decision. 
While the Westland Mall case was under appeal, the 
UAW filed for elections at two other stores. An election 
was held at the Summit Mall store in Pontiac on October 
12,1990. The union lost 157-187 and filed ULP charges. 
After a hearing, the NLRB determined that Hudson's 
preelection conduct had prevented a fair election. The 
primary illegal actions involved giving employees ben-
efits (including pay increases) in order to influence their 
votes, and threatening that the employees would lose 
their retirement benefits if the union won the election. 
On September 12,1992, the NLRB reached a settlement 
agreement with Dayton Hudson's requiring a rerun elec-
tion. After reevaluating its support at the store, the UAW 
decided that the two-year delay and the company's illegal 
conduct had taken its toll so it withdrew before the 
scheduled vote. 
The other store where the UAW organized was at the 
Fairlane Town Center in Dearborn. The UAW won a nar-
row victory in an April 1991 vote. However, the election 
was challenged by the employer because (unbeknownst 
to the UAW) a worker who supported the union had kept 
a list of employees in her department to make sure that 
they voted. Such list-keeping may constitute a technical 
violation in some circumstances, and the election was 
overturned by the NLRB. A second vote was held on Au-
gust 9,1991, but was lost narrowly by the union. 
The second Fairlane election was eventually over-
turned by the NLRB due to numerous employer ULPs. 
The violations included the same type of threats and 
promises Hudson's had used in the Summit Mall cam-
paign, plus a host of more aggressive union-busting ac-
tivities. Among the more blatant violations were follow-
ing employees into restrooms, videotaping workers 
while they leafletted or spoke to union organizers, 
threatening physical harm to UAW organizers in front of 
employees, and monitoring phone calls. 
Hudson's reached a settlement agreement and posted 
an NLRB notice at the Fairlane store, agreeing to "cease 
and desist" from twenty-two specific types of illegal be-
havior including all of those just mentioned. Other acts 
covered by the notice were threatening to close, solicit-
ing employee grievances, and recruiting workers to serve 
on a vote-no committee and to organize opposition to 
the UAW. A third election was scheduled for October 30, 
1992. 
However, while the notice was posted Hudson's re-
peated the same type of behavior—intimidation, harass-
ment, threats, interrogation, and spying. In addition, 
when a union organizer would enter the store, he or 
she would be followed at close range by four or five man-
agers, who would yell and make loud insulting com-
ments. The election was cancelled, and on February 26, 
1993 the NLRB issued a complaint detailing more than 
100 separate violations. Included were actions by the 
president of Hudson's, store managers, department man-
agers, human resource managers, and store security. 
Hudson's was charged with hiring a security firm to spy 
on employees. 
Hudson's use of these aggressive tactics had the de-
sired impact: workers interested in union representation 
became frustrated and lost hope. Leonard Militello, a 
salesman at the FairlaneTown Center store, noted that 
"Dayton Hudson's has threatened, bribed, harassed, and 
ridiculed UAW supporters at its store ever since it lost 
the election at Westland." Mary Flowers, a UAW member 
at Westland adds, "You just can't have a fair election 
when a company abuses its power the way Dayton 
Hudson's has." 
Ironically, Hudson's president Dennis Toffolo attempt-
ed to deflect attention from the company's exploitation 
of the legal process by attacking the UAW. Using the al-
leged forgery of union authorization cards at Westland as 
a hook, Toffolo charged, "It is clear the UAW attempted to 
use the NLRB procedures to the detriment of the very 
people they were meant to protect." On another occa-
sion he exhorted, "When any organization plays fast and 
loose with federal laws and commits fraudulent acts, it 
has to be an embarrassment to them when they get 
caught. The UAW owes Hudson's employees some an-
swers." 
Meanwhile, the appeal in the Westland Mall case was 
still pending before the Sixth Circuit Court. Hudson's 
had actually used the delays in the Westland case as one 
of its campaign themes at other stores. Hudson's 
claimed to its employees that the UAW's inability to force 
it to the bargaining table at Westland was evidence of the 
union's lack of power, in essence bragging about its abil-
ity to manipulate the legal process to frustrate workers' 
efforts to exercise bargaining rights. 
The Sixth Circuit Court ordered the NLRB to hold a 
hearing on whether cards were forged at Westland and, 
if they were, what impact that had on the election. The 
Mary Grab, President of the Westland Mall employees' local union, 
speaks at a rally outside Dayton Hudson's stockholders meeting in 
Minneapolis on May 27,1992. 
hearing was held January 18,1994. The decision by Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) Marion Ladwig minced no 
words:'! find that the whole basis of the company's 
motion to reopen the record is grounded on fabricated 
evidence." Dayton Hudson's star witness Medgwick's 
testimony was described as "false," "not candid," and 
"conflicting." When his testimony contradicted the 
signed statement he made at the company's urging 
in 1991, he claimed he had been lying in the affidavit. 
The ALJ even discredited as a fabrication his claim to 
have lied. 
The judge traced Medgwick's motivation for turning 
against the union in part to his concern that "women's 
rights were becoming more and more prevalent," and his 
frustration that "big ticket" employees (higher paid sales 
consultants such as himself) were losing control of the 
union. The ALJ also noted that before inventing his story 
of forged authorization cards, Medgwick had met and 
talked with Dayton Hudson's president Toffolo on several 
occasions, and that an $8,055.79 deficit in his commis-
sion account had been erased by the company. 
In an arrogant response to the decision,Toffolo con-
veniently forgot his exhortations that the UAW abide by 
NLRB procedures and the law and announced,"I'm not 
surprised because I never expected the NRLB to ques-
tion their own electoral process.... As you know, the 
case regarding the Westland card forgery issue has been 
in the legal system for four years.. ..We will continue 
with our appeal." • 
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Chosun Daily News • 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 
Workers at Chosun Daily News rally support 
after the editor responded to their efforts 
to form a union by instituting unilateral 
changes and discriminating against union 
advocates. 
CHOSUN IL BO (Chosun Daily News) is a Korean-lan-
guage newspaper published in New York City. The Pro-
fessional and Clerical Employees (PACE), a division of the 
ILGWU, began an organizing drive in June 1989. PACE 
obtained signed authorization cards from fourteen of sev-
enteen workers in a wall-to-wall unit, including the edito-
rial, advertising, typesetting, and subscription depart-
ments. The workers demanded that their union be rec-
ognized on September 27 in a meeting with Kim Joong 
Kil, president of Chosun America, the publisher. Kim 
responded with a threat to close the newspaper, saying 
that the Korean headquarters, Chosun Korea, would con-
sider "labor problems" as a reason to shut down the New 
York operation. 
The next day Kim announced a new disciplinary 
policy, according to which workers would be fired for 
any two work rule infractions. He also changed the 
hours of work. A day later he announced a probationary 
policy and threatened to close down the paper because 
of "financial" problems. He also redressed a long-stand-
ing sore point: pay for those required to work three-and-
one-half hours Saturday mornings was increased from 
$10 cash to $20. 
Later, Kim called Sook Lyol Park and Eun Hee Park 
into his office. These two had emerged as leaders of the 
union organizing drive. Kim expressed his displeasure 
concerning their union activity, and he ordered both of 
them to report to work one-half hour earlier each day 
without extra pay. 
The next week Kim called all the workers who had 
signed cards into his office individually. He threatened 
that unionization might lead the Korean headquarters to 
close the New York office. On the other hand, he sug-
gested that if the workers rejected the ILGWU Chosun 
Korea might give increased support. He promised to in-
stitute medical insurance in the future if the workers re-
jected the union. He then asked each worker to sign a 
statement renouncing the ILGWU. Kim exchanged a 
signed promise of medical benefits for a signed agree-
ment from one employee that she would withdraw her 
support for the union. 
PACE lost the November 9 election by a 7-7 tie vote. 
The ILGWU filed multiple unfair labor practice (ULP) 
charges. The case was heard by an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) on July 2 and 3,1990. Her decision was is-
These women lost their jobs when Chosun Daily News laid off work-
ers in response to a campaign for independent representation. 
sued January 31,1991, and found for the union on all 
key charges. Based on the intensity of the antiunion 
campaign and the union's majority support for PACE 
when it filed for a representation election, the ALT set 
aside the vote. She recommended that the union be 
certified and ordered Chosun America to bargain with 
the ILGWU. 
The company appealed but the NLRB upheld the bar-
gaining order on July 29,1991. In a footnote included in 
its decision, the board pointed out that the bargaining 
order was especially appropriate given that Kim was still 
in charge of the operation and that three-quarters of the 
employees at the time of the organizing campaign still 
worked for Chosun America. By the time the NLRB is-
sued its decision, this footnote was no longer accurate. 
In October 1990 Chosun America had laid off eight 
workers, including all of the active unionists. Eventually, 
the company reduced its staff to two bargaining unit em-
ployees. The paper continued to be published using 
Chosun Korea employees temporarily assigned to 
Chosun America. In late summer 1991, approximately 
one month after the NLRB decision, Chosun II Bo was 
sold by Chosun America to the Korean Channel, another 
Korean-language media firm. In the first edition under its 
direction, Korean Channel announced that it had been 
chosen by Chosun Korea to continue the paper. The 
Korean Channel published the paper without interrup-
tion or substantive change. The "new" Chosun II Bo 
had the same name, masthead, subscription list, vending 
machines, advertisers and equipment as the "old" 
Chosun II Bo. 
The "new" Chosun II Bo immediately hired eighteen 
additional workers, increasing the number of bargaining 
unit positions to twenty. Two of the eight union activists 
who had been laid off the year before applied for jobs. 
Wan Mo Kang was interviewed by Cho Han Kang, the 
new managing editor. The two were acquainted, and 
Cho knew that Wan had been a reporter and a leader of 
the organizing drive at Chosun II Bo two years earlier. 
He was not hired. 
Chan Yong Jong, another former employee and union 
supporter, also applied for work. The president of the 
Korean Channel told Jong that he would not hire him "in 
order to prevent the union from claiming that the Korean 
Channel was a successor" to Chosun America. In other 
words, the Korean Channel was openly attempting to 
avoid any obligation to bargain with the ILGWU under 
the NLRB order. 
The ILGWU filed ULP charges for the discharge of 
union supporters late in 1990, and the refusal to hire 
Wan and Chan in 1991, and sought a bargaining order for 
the Korean Channel as the successor employer. 
An ALT held hearings on May 11,1992. Chosun 
America was found to have unlawfully laid off union sup-
porters in 1990 and 1991, and back pay was awarded. 
However, the Korean Channel was exonerated of dis-
crimination in its refusal to hire the two former union 
activists. Furthermore, because only two of the twenty 
workers at the "new" Chosun II Bo had worked for the 
"old" Chosun II Bo, the bargaining order was with-
drawn—this although Chosun America admitted that it 
was a subsidiary of Chosun Korea and in spite of the fact 
that Chosun Korea had selected the Korean Channel to 
operate the "new" Chosun II Bo. 
In this case the employer openly violated the law 
when the workers at Chosun II Bo decided to organize a 
union. Although the process was slow, the NLRB recog-
nized the discriminatory behavior and ordered Chosun 
America to bargain. However, Chosun Korea was able to 
escape the impact of the NLRB decisions by reassigning 
the contract to publish Chosun II Bo to what was either 
a different contractor or a subsidiary of the parent corpo-
ration. The successorship doctrine of the NLRB allowed 
the company to defeat the workers' attempt to organize 
without any effective recourse. • 
FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW 
S ome employers are not content to work within the friendly confines of NLRB regula-tions. Instead they openly violate the law, most often by discriminating against the lead-
ers of union organizing drives. Nearly half of the cases 
submitted to the IUD for this project included specific 
details of workers being disciplined, laid off, and fired for 
union activity. In most of them, the NLRB eventually 
ruled against the employer—but long after workers had 
already halted the organizing campaign out of fear. 
These flagrant violations are all too common because 
penalties are so weak. Financial penalties usually are as-
sessed only in cases of discharge or discriminatory denial 
of pay or benefit improvements. And the penalties are 
limited to the losses experienced by the workers in-
volved. In the case of discharges, earnings from other 
jobs held in the interim are deducted from the award. 
In fact, most cases are resolved by settlement agreements 
which confer only a fraction of the amount due. 
For violations less serious than discharges, the most 
common remedy for employer ULPs is a cease and desist 
order which must be posted in central locations on the 
company's property. Unfortunately, even if they post the 
decision as required, many employers simply ignore the 
order. In rare cases in which employer conduct is "egre-
gious," a bargaining order may be issued even if the 
union loses the election. However, under federal court 
decisions, this is allowed only if the union can prove ma-
jority status prior to the violations. 
As you will see, the cases in this section are examples 
of blatant disregard for both the rights of workers and 
the law. 
POWER, INC. This British-owned company attempted to 
crush an organizing campaign by firing thirteen union 
supporters two weeks before the election. While the 
case awaited resolution before the NLRB, the company 
continued its hardball tactics by contracting out the jobs 
of union supporters, threatening years of legal delays, 
and vowing never to hire back the fired unionists. 
DOMSEY TRADING CO. The excessive nature of this 
company's attacks on union workers is almost inconceiv-
able. The case is replete with firings, obscene verbal in-
sults, physical attacks, racism, and sexual harassment. 
In spite of decisions for the union at every stage, the 
NLRB is essentially powerless to deal with unbridled 
union busting such as displayed here. 
FARRIS FASHIONS Another case in which the threat to 
close the plant was the centerpiece of the employer's 
union avoidance campaign, this one is particularly tell-
ing. Faced with a ruling that included a bargaining order, 
Farris's lawyers actually threatened the NLRB that if the 
board ruled against the company, the plant would close. 
GRESS POULTRY In this case a union-busting consultant 
openly ran the employer's campaign, conducting captive 
audience meetings, delivering plant closing threats, and 
committing other labor law violations. The consultant 
was jointly charged with the company, and after seven 
years of appeals he was found guilty. His "penalty" was 
to post a notice in his consulting office, allowing all of 
his potential clients to witness firsthand just how anemic 
labor law is. • 
POWER, INC. • United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) 
OSCEOLA MILLS, PENNSYLVANIA 
This shed was the outpost for Power work-
ers when they struck in response to numer-
ous unfair labor practices during the winter 
of 1989-90. 
ON DECEMBER 13, 1988, the UMWA was contacted by 
John Acey, Jr., an employee of Power, Inc. Power is an 
Osceola Mills, Pennsylvania, surface-mining operation 
owned by Ryan International of Great Britain. On De-
cember 22, Acey and three other workers met with a 
UMWA representative and decided to start an organizing 
drive. An election petition was filed on January 6,1989, 
with the support of forty-eight workers among the sev-
enty-four employed by Power. 
The company's reaction was swift and furious. Super-
visors William Bratton and Pete Prohaska warned work-
ers in one-on-one discussions that the operation would 
close if the union was successful. General Foreman Larry 
Dipko went a step further, identifying the leaders of the 
organizing drive by name to other employees and threat-
ening to fire the "troublemakers." On March 10,1989, 
thirteen days before the election, the company laid off 
thirteen workers, all of them open supporters of union 
representation including John Acey, Jr., and the other 
leaders of the organizing campaign. 
Chris Hotson, the chairman of Ryan's board of direc-
tors, flew in from England and held captive audience 
meetings on March 21. Hotson told the workers that 20 
percent of Ryan's mines in Great Britain were unionized, 
and that he had shut down one of the mines when he 
could not reach an agreement with the union. He explic-
itly repeated the threats to close Power, saying that even-
tually any union would put a company out of business. 
Hotson referred to the laid-off employees as "past his-
tory," and he claimed that they had planned to lead the 
workers out on strike. 
The vote at the March 23 election was 27 yes and 30 
no, with the 13 ballots of the laid-off workers unopened 
because they were challenged by the employer. The 
union filed unfair labor practice (ULP) charges based on 
the company's closing threats and the layoffs of the thir-
teen union activists. 
While the UMWA and the workers waited for the 
NLRB to schedule a hearing, the company continued its 
antiunion attacks. In September Frederick Bosch, the at-
torney for Power, held small group meetings and in-
formed employees that any adverse NLRB decisions 
would be appealed, stating that "it is going to be a long 
drawn out affair" that could take three to four years. He 
warned that anyone who helped the thirteen laid-off 
workers would be fired and proclaimed that "the fucking 
thirteen guys ain't coming back." He also said that any-
The workers' shed 
was flattened by 
Power's bulldozer. 
one going on strike would be replaced even if it were an 
unfair labor practice strike. The UMWA filed additional 
ULP charges which were consolidated with the prior 
charges and the challenged ballot issue. 
Meanwhile, on December 8,1989, Power laid off six 
more workers (all known union supporters) and con-
tracted out their work. The UMWA called for an unfair 
labor practice strike on December 8,1989, which re-
ceived modest support from the workers. Over the next 
several months the strikers individually or in pairs of-
fered to return to work unconditionally—four of them 
were refused. In November 1990, the company con-
tracted out more work and laid off two additional known 
union advocates. 
As new ULPs piled up, they were appended to the 
previous case. All of this delayed decisions on the chal-
lenged ballots and the prior charges. An administrative 
law judge's (ALJ) decision was finally issued on May 6, 
1992. The company was found guilty of most of the ULP 
charges, including the discriminatory layoffs, the threats, 
and the unilateral contracting out of work. On the chal-
lenged ballots, the thirteen ballots from the laid-off em-
ployees were declared valid. The company appealed. 
The NLRB issued its decision on the appeal on May 
28,1993, upholding the ALJ decision on all substantive 
points. Back pay was ordered for the workers fired for 
union activity and is estimated to exceed $3 million. The 
thirteen challenged ballots finally were opened on June 
22, more than four years after they were cast. As ex-
pected all were for the union, and the final vote stood at 
40 yes, 30 no. Power appealed the decision to the D.C. 
Court of Appeals. The case has been scheduled for Octo-
ber 7,1994, with a decision expected early in 1995. 
Power, Inc. and its British parent, Ryan International, 
have openly violated the law. The union has won on al-
most every ULP charge it has filed, and yet it will be more 
than six years from the time when 65 percent of the 
workers signed petitions supporting the UMWA before 
the case is resolved. Even then, the company will have 
a variety of options to avoid responsibility, ranging from 
bankruptcy to evasive bargaining. 
John Acey, Jr., lost his job, as did his father and his 
brother. All of the union activists have been denied em-
ployment at other mines in the nonunion Shannon Valley 
area where they live. Acey reports,"It's been hard to find 
steady work. A lot of the guys have had to live away from 
home, sometimes out of state, picking up construction 
and other jobs which pay a lot less than before.... They're 
supposed to have this National Labor Relations Act to pro-
tect you, but it's just words—no bite. After five years 
we're still out here waiting for a final decision. The law 
doesn't work. It has to have a complete overhaul." • 
DOMSEY TRADING CORP. • 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) 
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 
Domsey workers protest firings of the four 
leaders of their campaign for independent 
representation. 
DOMSEY TRADING CORP. buys used clothing donated to 
organizations such as the Salvation Army and exports the 
clothes to Third World countries. The company exports 
5 million pounds of clothes per month, and reports gross 
annual sales of $15 million. Its employees are mostly 
Haitian and Latin American immigrants. 
In September 1989 a Domsey worker contacted the 
ILGWU and asked for assistance in organizing a union. 
Her description of working conditions shocked organizer 
Joe Blount: "It sounded like a slave camp." Each Domsey 
worker was assigned a number and wore a tag pinned to 
his or her shirt with the number on it. Supervisors re-
ferred to them by the number rather than using names, 
such as "Twenty-two, have you seen thirty-five?" Women 
workers were allowed to go to the bathroom only if they 
had a pass, and one pass had to be shared among the 
nearly two hundred women. A Newsday reporter who 
visited Domsey in 1990 described "unsanitary conditions" 
in the women's bathroom, including, "dirty, encrusted 
toilet bowls, with no toilet paper, soap or hand towels 
to be found." 
An ILGWU organizational meeting on October 26, 
1989, attracted one hundred workers. The next day, su-
pervisors assigned two dozen workers to more difficult 
tasks because they had gone to the union meeting. Giles 
Robinson, an employee for twenty-seven years who had 
attended the union meeting, was approached by plant 
manager Peter Salm. Salm started an argument and then 
told Robinson, "Don't raise your voice at me because I'll 
throw you right out on your ass." 
On December 1 Joe Blount came to Domsey to request 
recognition for the ILGWU. Seventy-six percent of em-
ployees had signed cards in a unit of 243. Giles Robinson 
informed Peter Salm that the union was there to see him. 
Fifteen minutes later Robinson was fired. Salm told him, 
"We're having trouble with the union and we've decided 
to let you go.. .because you're instigating the problem." 
That afternoon, the employer's attorney told the union's 
attorney that he was not worried, because even if Domsey 
had to reinstate Robinson, the back pay liability would 
not amount to much. 
By late January Domsey fired three more members of 
the union organizing committee—Lucien Henry, Ann 
Dormeville, and James Charles. From January 30 to August 
31,1990, union supporters struck Domsey because of the 
illegal firings. At the start of the strike 90 percent of the 
employees walked out. Almost immediately Domsey 
began hiring replacement workers—mostly Dominican 
immigrants, apparently to exploit the historic animosity 
between Dominicans and Haitians. 
During the strike, management representatives sub-
jected the predominantly Haitian striking workers and 
union organizers to outrageous harassment. Peter Salm 
placed a "voodoo table" covered with a black tablecloth 
in front of picketing workers, placed candles and ba-
nanas on the table, and called to the workers, "This is for 
you monkeys to eat." He and his associates called pick-
eting women "whores," simulated sex acts with a dildo, 
and shouted explicit obscenities at them. They called 
pickets "lazy" and "stupid niggers." They told picketers 
that they were being sprayed with water to wash off 
their smells and their AIDS. 
Peter Salm also directed his venom toward ILGWU 
organizer Natalie Mercado. He spat on her car, and sev-
eral times asked her how many men she "fucked" the 
night before and how much money she made. On one 
occasion he threw a brick at her car; part of it broke off 
and struck the side of her head, giving her headaches, 
bloodshot eyes, and ringing ears. 
On August 10,1990, the 132 remaining striking 
workers unconditionally requested to return to work. 
Domsey refused to rehire some of them and delayed the 
return of the others for several weeks. Once reinstated 
employees suffered severe abuse, including physical at-
tacks and verbal harassment. Sam Padgett played a par-
ticularly repugnant role and was later compared by a 
NLRB official toAttila the Hun. As strikers returned to 
work, Padgett would be assigned to work near them. 
While standing across the conveyor belt from Marie 
Rose Joseph on her first day back, Padgett spat on her 
and cursed at her incessantly. When Antoinette Romain 
was assigned to work with Padgett, he yelled "mother-
fucker" at her and hurled bundles of coats four to five 
feet in diameter in her direction. One hit her in the 
back and she was taken away in an ambulance. 
Peter Salm joined Padgett in some of his excesses. 
When Marie Nicole Mathieu returned to work, Peter 
told her she smelled and spat in her face. When she left 
work that day she was followed to the bus stop by 
Padgett, who pushed her into a car and punched her in 
the face. She was hospitalized because of the injuries 
caused by the attack, then fired for not reporting to 
Giles Robinson, an employee for twenty-
seven years, was fired for his involvement 
in Domsey workers' efforts to organize a 
union. 
work the next day. When Dieulenveux Zama was rein-
stated, Peter confronted him at the water fountain and 
asked him what his number was. When Zama gave him 
his name instead, he was immediately fired. In addition 
to Mathieu and Zama, ten other returning strikers were 
arbitrarily fired. Many others quit in fear and disgust. 
An NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted 
hearings on the Domsey case and on November 2,1991, 
issued a lengthy decision detailing the company's mul-
tiple violations of the law. Three months prior to the re-
lease of the decision the NLRB had taken the unusual 
step of securing a federal court injunction ordering 
Domsey to cease its unfair labor practices (ULP). The ALJ 
ordered Domsey to reinstate fifteen workers with back 
pay, and to compensate in varying amounts an additional 
two hundred workers for delays in reinstatement or ben-
efits withheld. In addition, Peter Salm would be required 
to read a cease and desist order before the assembled 
employees of Domsey. While fighting the federal court 
injunction, Domsey also appealed the ALJ decision. 
On March 27,1992, the ILGWU lost a representation 
election at Domsey 170 to 120. Only 87 of the original 
strikers were on the payroll, while 150 replacement 
workers hired during the ULP strike voted. On August 1, 
1992, the NLRB overturned the election because of the 
employer's multiple ULPs. This board decision is cur-
rently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals in New 
York. On July 30,1992, the federal court found Domsey 
in contempt of its earlier injunction ordering the com-
pany to cease its ULPs. Domsey appealed this decision 
as well. 
In the final piece of the legal morass, on March 23, 
1993, the NLRB upheld the 1991 ALJ decision. In the 
ultimate irony, the NLRB decision was devoted primarily 
to a defense of the ALJ order that Peter Salm read the 
cease and desist notice and admit labor law violations to 
the assembled employees of Domsey. It seems that a 
prior Federal Appeals Court decision had found that such 
a requirement could be humiliating. Thus, the NLRB had 
to explain, "We do not impose this remedy for punitive 
reasons." 
As of July 1994, a final resolution of Domsey's appeals 
had still not been reached. Regardless of the outcome, 
there are no adequate penalties under current law to ad-
dress Domsey's blatant and disgusting disregard both for 
the law and for human decency. It is incredible that a 
slap on the wrist such as the requirement that Salm read 
the cease and desist order is viewed as an extreme mea-
sure that requires a carefully reasoned explanation by 
the NLRB. • 
FARRIS FASHIONS • 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) 
BRINKLEY AND HAZEN, ARKANSAS 
FARRIS FASHIONS is a successful sewing company that 
sells almost exclusively to Wal-Mart. Most members of 
the work force are women, a majority are African-Ameri-
can. Few workers are able to earn $5 per hour under the 
company's piece rate system. The company provides no 
medical insurance for its employees. 
ACTWU began organizing at Farris in October 1990 
and attained majority support on representation cards 
before filing for an election on October 23. ACTWU sub-
sequently lost an NLRB-conducted election by a vote of 
202 to 60 on December 14,1990.The defeat resulted 
from a systematic and comprehensive company cam-
paign that relied on repeated threats of plant closure, 
harassment, and interrogation of workers during the 
preelection period, and illegal layoffs of two key union 
supporters after the election. 
The threats of plant closure began in October when 
owner Farris Burroughs told employees during a captive 
audience speech, "if you don't quit messing with the 
union, I will close the plant down, turn it into a chicken 
coop and sell manure." 
In a subsequent speech Burroughs told employees 
that Wal-Mart owner Sam Walton would pull his contract 
if the union did not stop messing with him (Burroughs): 
"Walton doesn't buy union-made goods or deal with 
union plants." 
Just twenty-four hours before the election, Burroughs 
read a speech to his employees which said, in part, "All I 
want to do is make it perfectly clear that if this union is 
voted in, I have the absolute right to close these plants 
down and there is nothing the union can do to stop me." 
Supervisors were used throughout the campaign to rein-
force the plant closing threats on the factory floor. 
Burroughs's campaign to scare workers with the 
threat of eliminating their jobs was buttressed by support 
from elected officials and the local news media. 
Burroughs arranged for Steve Elledge, a local judge, to 
review the company's financial records and to answer 
questions about finances in an employee meeting. Dur-
ing the meeting Burroughs publicly asked Elledge if he 
could afford to close the plant. Elledge confirmed that 
he could. At Burroughs's suggestion, Brinkley's mayor 
Johnny Deen told a number of Farris Fashions employees 
one-on-one, "You guys don't want to lose your jobs. You 
need your job more than you need anything else." 
NOTICE!!! 
On December 3, 1990, the people of BriiMcley are expecting an earth-
quake. The scientist sayt we have a 50/50 chance of a major earthquake. 
Brlnkley citizen* are getting prepared. 
On December 1 A, 1990, the people of Farris Fashions are going to have 
an election to decide whether to accept a union or not. This" union has a 
50/50 chance of getting in. Are employees of Forrish fashions prepared? 
(1) Are?Brinldey citizenspr»po\ed» ' '" ''•> V * w ' '^ ' 
,iip}-Can Bfinkley take rhe elrFectsjW i l 5 peopjTi , 
Remember when Howard Industries and Van Heuien cfos-
(3) Con Farris Fashions afford to pay major medical jnsuq 
people? The amount per year would equal Jht sum of !*~ 
14) If Farris Fashions employees get msuranc 
"•(^'ore the flannel shjrts'we rr^ke worthT^JTmoVie^l, 
question is not if Wal-Mart can afford more; but is our product worth 
mqfe money! Wal-Mart can make the same shirts that we do overseas for 
doout 70% per dozen less. How far wilt Wal-Mart go to get their oro-
4^@®fc t? *$#$&'"-'•'••' '^•***-•; •.-'«»-'••" 
Y(5) Dp y^u,,at^ jyal-Mart.cystonwr, want to pay more than $6 for 
these flannel shifts? ,. :'~,
 | ( ( f?l C 
. (6) Is it fair that the owner of Farris Fashions make a paycheck o less 
than $12 per hour? This man works about 16 hours per day. Does the 
owner sit up in a big fine office all day? Would you pay yourself the same 
amount if you were him? Or would you sit in a big, fine office? 
Before we possibly have two'disasters' in Brinkley, ask questions, get 
facts, and VOTE NOI Ask Farris to let you see his books on the factory I 
Go to Clarendon to the courthousel Ask to see what Farris owes on the 
building. Look to see what he owes on the machinery. Ask him what he 
pays per month incentive pay. Ask him what he pays on holiday pay. Ask 
questionsl VOTE NO ON DECEMBER U , 1990. 
One final date to remember—Christmas is on December 25,1990. Most 
people hang stockings by the chimney with care—m our locking, we might 
find an unemployment card. Wropped-up under your nke pretty tree, might 
be our 'Union Card.' 
We say that would make three disasters! 
VOTE NO! 
Sincerely, - ' 
Employees of Farrish Fashions 
The Farris Fashions "Vote No" committee 
distributed this flyer, echoing the com-
pany's warning that a vote for union repre-
sentation would cause the factory to close. 
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Supporters of independent representation 
at Farris explain why they are voting yes. 
Three days before the election, Mayor Deen called a spe-
cial meeting of the Brinkley Board of Directors to discuss the 
situation at Farris Fashions. The board specifically addressed 
the possibility that Farris would close if the workers voted to 
unionize, and the city attorney stated that Burroughs had the 
legal right to close for any reason. The mayor explained that 
Burroughs could not afford better health insurance, and he 
stressed the need to keep costs down in order to hold on to 
the Wal-Mart contract. The meeting ended with Mayor Deen 
emphasizing, "We want to be pro jobs," and with an agree-
ment to set up a committee to work with employees and 
employers as an alternative to unionization. 
The special meeting of the Brinkley Board of Directors 
was covered in detail in the local paper, the Brinkley Argus, 
on December 12 under the front page headline "Board of 
Directors Meet—Discuss Union/Job Crisis." On the same 
day a local Brinkley radio station began broadcasting a re-
port that Farris Fashions would "close operations if the union 
is voted in." The story ran with each news broadcast until 
sometime after 9:00 a.m. on election day, December 14. 
After losing the election, the union filed unfair labor prac-
tice (ULP) charges based primarily on the company's all-out 
campaign to convince workers that voting for the union 
would inevitably mean plant closure. In an administrative 
law judge (ALJ) hearing.ACTWU established that a clear ma-
jority of Farris Fashion employees had signed union represen-
tation cards prior to the election. The union argued that the 
illegal tactics used by the employer destroyed the union ma-
jority. In a decision issued July 2,1992, ALJ Elbert Gadshen 
agreed. He found Farris guilty of multiple ULPs and con-
cluded that the repeated plant closing threats were so perva-
sive and such serious violations that it would be impossible 
to conduct a fair rerun election. Thus, rather than order a 
second vote he recommended that the union be certified 
based on the signed cards, and he issued a bargaining order. 
Farris appealed the decision to the NLRB. Perhaps the 
most chilling aspect of this situation is that Burroughs, 
through his attorney, subsequently threatened the NLRB 
with plant closure. In its post-trial brief the Farris attorneys 
warned against a bargaining order: "Not only is such a 
drastic remedy unwarranted, it would be a disaster for Farris 
Fashions' employees and the Brinkley, Arkansas area, be-
cause Farris Fashions will close if it ultimately has to bargain 
with the union. This is a fact that the union and NLRB 
should not doubt." On September 30,1993, the NLRB ig-
nored the company's threat, and issued a bargaining order. 
Farris appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals. A decision had 
not been reached as of July 1994. • 
Gress Poultry • 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) 
SCRANTON, PENNSYLVANIA 
THE UFCW conducted an organizing campaign among 
250 workers at Gress Poultry in 1986. Half of the work-
ers were immigrants from Latin America, India, Cambo-
dia, Laos, and Vietnam. In spite of the challenge of com-
municating in seven different languages, the union was 
able to secure signed union authorization cards from 
nearly 70 percent of the employees. An election was 
scheduled for December 23,1986. 
Gress hired antiunion consultant Rayford Blankenship 
to help it defeat the UFCW Blankenship and his associ-
ate Richard Buntele held a series of three captive audi-
ence meetings for each of the three shifts—the first 
meetings in early December, the second around ten days 
before the election, and the final meetings the day before 
the election. The theme at these meetings was straight-
forward—if the union won the plant would be closed. 
Union supporter Charles Sears recalls that at one meet-
ing, "Buntele claimed that if the union got in Gress would 
lock the place up and retire." According to Barbara 
Teddick, also a Gress worker, at another meeting Buntele 
said that Jim Gress's wife was sick and that Jim Gress 
didn't have to negotiate with the workers because he 
would move to a warmer climate to be with his wife. 
For his part, Blankenship told the employees about 
one of his clients who had lost an election and pad-
locked the plant. To make sure that his speech was un-
derstood by the multilingual audience, he held up a huge 
padlock for everyone to see. During the preelection pe-
riod the company reinforced Blankenship's message on 
two occasions by sending more than fifty suspected 
union supporters home two hours early. 
The campaign continued on election day, as 
Blankenship held a picture of a lock and key, and told 
employees that the employer had given him a padlock to 
lock the door when he closed the plant down. In addi-
tion to the threats, Blankenship took photographs of em-
ployees talking to union organizers, took a "vote yes" 
sign from an organizer's car and ripped it up, and ver-
bally attacked and insulted a union organizer in front of a 
group of employees. 
After losing the election 114 to 71 with 38 challenged 
ballots, the union filed objections and unfair labor prac-
tice (ULP) charges. Because Blankenship had actually 
delivered threats himself (most consultants stay in the 
background), he was charged jointly along with the em-
ployer. Before an administrative law judge (ALT) the com-
pany admitted hiring consultant Blankenship to "run an 
antiorganizing campaign." Vice President Glenn Gress 
(son of the owner) explained that the union resistance 
effort featured "all the propaganda" and "your normal 
antiorganizing campaign slogans." The case inched its 
way through the NLRB process with decisions for the 
union at every step. The NLRB even issued a complaint 
seeking a bargaining order based on the card check ma-
jority, because the Gresses and their agent Blankenship 
had so tainted the election process. 
The company and the consultant appealed each deci-
sion. Ultimately the UFCW decided to give up on the bar-
gaining order and reached a settlement agreement with 
Gress on January 18,1989- The agreement called for 
Gress Poultry to make payments totalling over $13,000 to 
employees subjected to discriminatory treatment during 
the campaign, and to the UFCW. The company did not 
admit to any labor law violations, but did agree to an ex-
pedited rerun election. The second election was held on 
April 7,1989, and the union lost once again 71-38 with 
30 challenged ballots. 
However, the Gress Poultry story was not yet com-
plete. It seems that for consultant Rayford Blankenship 
labor law violations such as those at Gress Poultry were 
integral to his success as a union buster. As the NLRB 
noted, "For more than a decade, Blankenship's name has 
come before the board as an agent who has committed 
repeated unlawful acts on behalf of the employer/clients 
who hired him. Respondent's pattern or practice of vio-
lations include: unlawful threats of loss of work or plant 
closing, unlawful undermining of support for a union by 
urging employees to bargain directly with the employer, 
overall bad-faith bargaining, locking out employees while 
engaging in bad-faith bargaining, and unlawful solicita-
tion of grievances and promise of benefits." In light of 
this previous behavior, the NLRB decided to join with 
the UFCW and continued to pursue the case against 
Blankenship. 
On July 18,1990, an administrative law judge found 
that Blankenship had committed five ULPs during the 
period of the 1986 election. He issued a cease and desist 
order and a requirement that Blankenship post the order 
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conspicuously in his offices in Greenwood, Indiana. 
Blankenship appealed to the NLRB. Nearly two years 
later on March 31,1992, the NLRB noted Blankenship s 
ten-year record of labor law violations and upheld theALJ 
decision. Blankenship appealed. 
On July 15,1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals enforced 
the NLRB order. In perhaps the ultimate statement at-
testing to the enforcement power of the NLRB, 
Blankenship officially informed the board that the notice 
had been posted "on the seat of our employees' toilet." 
On September 8, 1993, the NLRB initiated civil contempt 
proceedings. 
Although the continuing saga of Rayford Blankenship 
has vindicated the UFCW organizers who worked on the 
Gress Poultry campaign, there is little satisfaction in this 
sad experience.The owners of the company admittedly 
contracted the services of a known labor law violator 
with the sole objective of defeating the efforts of their 
employees to organize a union. The Gresses succeeded, 
and their only "penalty" was a modest settlement agree-
ment that allowed them to proclaim their innocence. 
For his part, Rayford Blankenship pushed the NLRB 
process to the limit and his punishment was to post a 
notice in his office for all his potential clients to see. Not 
content with this slap on the wrist, he chose to insult the 
NLRB and was rewarded with free publicity for his 
union-busting services when the story was reported in 
the national press. 
Michele Kessler, a UFCW organizer who worked on 
the Gress campaign, aptly generalizes from the experi-
ence: "If an employer excessively breaks the law and con-
tinues to appeal, that employer can remain union-free. 
Over my seven years and one day I've been an organizer 
with UFCW I've seen many examples of campaigns killed 
by firings, and the law violated to intimidate. The system 
just takes too damn long to do anything, and once it does 
all we get is a notice—no teeth!!!" • 
Seven years after conducting an illegal 
campaign to stop workers from organizing 
a union at Gress Poultry, Rayford 
Blankenship's punishment was to post a 
notice in his consulting office. Not content 
to accept this slap on the wrist, 
Blankenship thumbed his nose at the NLRB 
and posted the notice on his employees' 
toilet. 
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT" AS UNION AVOIDANCE 
DOUG OAKS • 
I want NCR to be a successful busi-
ness. Yet, only if employees are 
treated fairly can we be successful 
in the future. 
MARK REDMON • 
As a younger employee, I am con-
cerned about the future. We need 
the right to organize to improve 
our conditions at work. 
When these workers joined with other field engineers to form the 
National Association of NCR Employees, the company established 
"Satisfaction Councils." These councils solicit employee concerns, 
but ultimate authority rests with the National Council composed 
entirely of NCR managers. 
RON WEEKLY • 
I serve on our district and region 
Satisfaction Council. I know from 
personal experience that our only 
chance to achieve parity in benefits, 
pensions, wages, and the right to 
organize is through NANE/CWA. 
JACK SLATTEN • 
In my 37 years at NCR, I have 
noticed the company grow less 
concerned about our needs and 
problems. We need a union in 
order to be treated fairly. 
T he debate on labor law reform as framed by the Clinton administration includes certain troubling ambiguities. In particular, the focus on productivity and cooperation between 
labor and management leaves open the question of how 
much priority should be assigned to the right of workers 
to independent representation. The Dunlop commission 
has devoted considerable attention to alternative forms 
of work organization such as quality control circles and 
team-based production, and it has concluded that such 
systems can work effectively and provide workers with 
"voice" in both union and nonunion settings. The com-
mission also has viewed favorably various alternative dis-
pute resolution systems, including in-house grievance 
procedures in nonunion companies. 
While the Dunlop commission and Clinton adminis-
tration are developing labor law reform proposals, em-
ployers are applying significant political pressure on 
their allies in Congress to relax the Wagner Act restric-
tions on employer-dominated labor organizations. Em-
ployers argue that these restrictions were enacted to 
prevent company unions but now limit nonunion experi-
ments with various forms of employee involvement. 
Without dealing in detail with either the Dunlop 
commission's interest in alternative forms of work orga-
nization or the employer community's parallel campaign 
to amend the Wagner Act, we feel that it is essential to 
address this issue in the context of workers' organizing 
campaigns. In many of the cases collected by the IUD, 
the employer used some form of employee involvement 
or in-house grievance procedure as an integral part of 
a union avoidance package. The adaptability of these 
programs to union-busting purposes should not be 
underestimated. 
In some cases employers use employee involvement 
or a grievance procedure as part of a "union free" policy, 
which is implemented company-wide to discourage 
unionization before it gains a foothold. Even more bla-
tant in terms of their union-busting intent are programs 
implemented in direct response to workers organizing. 
For example, in one case an employer established "satis-
faction councils" throughout the corporation after a 
union initiated a nationwide organizing campaign. In 
another case the employer set up "action committees" in 
response to complaints while workers were simulta-
neously approaching a union for organizing assistance. 
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"Management never wanted to listen to us before, so 
people were suspicious when all of a sudden they said 
they did." 
DIANE VERRETTE Electromation worker 
"This participation program was a way for the company 
to pretend to be on the side of the workers while 
making sure we had no protection and no voice." 
VERNA PRICE Chief Steward 
...the workers filed for a second election to become 
Teamsters when the government agreed that the 
management-dominated "cooperation" committees 
violated federal labor law. 
The New Teamsters, April/May 1994 
In a third case the employer introduced "task teams" in 
a factory in direct reaction to an organizing campaign 
and asked workers to support the teams as an alternative 
to unionization. 
The common thread is that the employer has the last 
word in these systems which give the appearance of a 
legitimate voice for workers. They are established not 
to solicit workers' concerns, but to forestall workers' 
efforts to seek independent representation. At their 
best they tap workers' knowledge in order to improve 
productivity and quality. At their worst (and often 
simultaneously) they are a cynical token response to the 
workers' frustration which has led to a union organizing 
campaign. 
In this section we present three cases. One tells of an 
employer-controlled grievance system introduced days 
before an NLRB election. Another reports on an elected 
grievance committee created immediately after the start 
of a union organizing drive. The third concerns an em-
ployee involvement system that was presented as a natu-
ral outgrowth of the company's system of workplace or-
ganization, but was not announced until after workers 
started to organize. All three programs were central to 
the company's union-busting game plan. 
FLAMINGO HILTON The company's aggressive anti-
union campaign included all of the standard ingredients: 
captive audience meetings, attacks on the union, threats 
of job loss, warnings that negotiations would not bring 
improvements, etc. A key feature of the company's strat-
egy was to announce a new "complaint resolution sys-
tem" to be implemented after the NLRB election if the 
union lost. 
These comments from workers at 
Electromation in Elkhart, Indiana, refer to 
the company's "action committees," estab-
lished in response to a petition protesting 
unilateral changes in pay and personnel 
policies. While the company determined 
who would serve on the action committees 
and what issues they could explore, the 
workers formed their own independent 
organization. The NLRB eventually ruled 
that the action committee structure consti-
tuted an illegal management-dominated 
labor organization. 
ELECTRONIC BANKING SYSTEM The day after a union 
meeting to kick off an organizing campaign, the em-
ployer held a captive audience meeting and required 
workers to elect a grievance committee. This was the 
opening volley in a union-busting effort that included 
surveillance cameras, open discrimination against union 
supporters, and a "vote no" committee set up by the 
employer. 
KMART Prior to the start of union organizing, the com-
pany had assigned workers into groups, appointed group 
leaders, and began to refer to employees as "associates." 
When organizing began the employer responded with an 
Associates Relations Committee, an Employee Involve-
ment Committee, and a Vote No Committee. • 
FLAMINGO HILTON • 
United Steelworkers of America (USWA) 
LAUGHUN, NEVADA 
H I L T O N 
L A U G H L I N 
{±C ELECTION* 
'HHl INFORMATION 
IF THE UNION CALLS A STRIKE 
TO TRY TO FORCE THE 
COMPANY TO AGREE TO THE 
UNION'S CONTRACT DEMANDS, 
WHAT CAN THE 
COMPANY DO....? 
HAW"// / / ; 
FACT: 
THE COMPANY IS FREE TO HIRE 
PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS 
FOR ECONOMiC STRIKERS 
SO THAT IT CAN 
CONTINUE TO OPERATE 
I This means that after thestrjkels over 
YOU COULD NO 
LONGER 
HAVE A JOB. 
This memo distributed by the Flamingo 
Hilton during a campaign by its workers to 
form a union is representative of the 
employer's intimidation campaign. It con-
trasts sharply with the Flamingo's promise 
of fair treatment via a new complaint reso-
lution policy described as "better than a 
grievance procedure under a union." 
THE FLAMINGO HILTON is a hotel-casino in Laughlin, 
Nevada.The USWA attempted to organize nearly one 
thousand employees at the Hilton in the summer of 
1993. During the campaign over 75 percent of the work-
ers signed union authorization cards, yet the USWA lost 
the July 6,1993 election by a vote of 389 to 495. 
Management was able to thwart the organizing effort 
by launching an aggressive antiunion campaign. Hilton 
held a series of captive audience meetings at which top 
management threatened reprisal if the union won and 
promised future benefits if the union lost. At one captive 
audience meeting, the workers were shown a film de-
picting violence taken out of context from a USWA strike 
at the Phelps-Dodge mining company ten years earlier. 
The most direct threats were delivered in one-on-one 
and small group meetings among Latino kitchen employ-
ees. These workers were explicitly threatened with job 
loss, and there were innuendos about reporting workers 
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for pos-
sible deportation. 
The company's campaign also included a stream of 
handbills distributed at the workplace and individually 
addressed letters. Particularly important was a memo 
dated June 22,1993, announcing the establishment of a 
"complaint resolution policy at the Flamingo Hilton-
Laughlin similar to the one we have at the [nonunion] 
Reno Hilton." The memo described the policy as follows: 
Under our policy, any non-probationary em-
ployee who believes that he or she has not been 
treated properly at work can file a complaint 
which will be resolved by a group of fellow em-
ployees and managers.This procedure is much 
better than a grievance procedure under a 
union. It is much quicker and you will be able 
to represent yourself. If you have any questions 
about our new policy, your supervisor has a 
copy and is available to go over the procedures 
with you. 
The policy was to take effect on August 1,1993, three 
weeks after the representation election. 
A look at the details of the complaint resolution 
policy exposes its limitations. At step one, the worker 
presents the complaint to his or her immediate supervi-
sor. At step two, the worker explains the problem to a 
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member of management from the human resources de-
partment. Appeals to step three are permitted only in 
cases involving a written warning, suspension, or termi-
nation. The appeal is heard by a five-member panel— 
two employees selected at random and three representa-
tives of upper management. The policy states explicitly 
that the panel's decision is "final and binding on the em-
ployee and the Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin." Furthermore, 
the worker filing the complaint is required to pursue the 
case totally on his or her own with "no outside represen-
tative allowed.. .at any step of the procedure." 
The promised complaint resolution policy is clearly 
dominated by the employer. Decisions at every stage of 
the process are made by a member of management or by 
a board with majority representation from management. 
The worker has no rights to representation, or even to 
influence membership on the appeals panel; the appeals 
panel itself is even limited by existing in-house human 
resource management regulations—"it can only interpret 
written policy and rules." More important than its limita-
tions, however, is how the policy was used in the 
Flamingo Hilton's antiunion campaign. The new policy 
was announced two weeks before the NLRB election and 
described as a superior alternative to a union grievance 
procedure. The details of the policy were shared with 
workers only if they asked for explanations from their 
supervisors. 
The spirit in which the complaint resolution policy 
was introduced is best reflected by the other compo-
nents of the Flamingo Hilton's union avoidance cam-
paign. Among the antiunion materials distributed by the 
Hilton were handbills and letters on weak NLRB laws, 
concession bargaining, and replacement workers. In one 
handbill the company described "What really happens in 
negotiations" based on specific NLRB cases: "The law 
does not prevent a company from implementing its final 
offer... The law does not prevent a company from requir-
ing a union to make concessions." Another flyer con-
cluded, "Normally during negotiations employees do not 
get any improvements." 
Also issued were handbills on the strike threat and 
loss of jobs, and letters on wage, benefit, and work rule 
improvements, which the company granted to workers 
during the campaign in an apparent effort to keep them 
from voting for the union. One handbill implied that the 
union is composed of crooks, and a letter suggested a 
possible blacklist of union workers at other Laughlin ho-
tels and casinos: 
Many employees have asked, will we be able to 
go to work for other Laughlin hotels if the 
United Steel Workers win the election?.. .We do 
know that the other hotel-casinos now in 
Laughlin do not have a union contract and are 
sure that the other hotel-casinos want to operate 
on a nonunion basis, and if you become a union 
member, the union could fine you for working at 
a nonunion company. We would never "black-
ball" anyone, but we can't speak for the other 
hotel-casinos in Laughlin. Before you vote "Yes", 
you might want to check with other hotel-casi-
nos here about your job opportunities if you 
come from a "union hotel.".. .why risk your fu-
ture job opportunities by voting in a union? 
As the election approached, Human Resources Direc-
tor John Kosinski adopted a caustic tone. In a memo to 
all employees dated July 3 (three days before the vote), 
Kosinski declared: "The Steelworkers are getting desper-
ate. The union's latest move is a phoney 'guarantee' that 
is completely worthless... .The only guarantee the union 
can make about negotiations is to take you out on strike 
if it can't get the company to agree on its proposals." The 
memo went on to ridicule the USWA assurance that it 
would not call a strike unless the workers voted for one. 
Kosinski referred to this as "a joke" and "a flat lie," and he 
claimed that "votes in the United Steelworkers are not by 
secret ballot so the union could 'rig' the vote." 
The Flamingo Hilton's outrageous propaganda and dis-
dain for the rights of workers to independent representa-
tion reflect the paranoid response that a showing of 
strong interest in unionization can prompt. The dramatic 
deterioration in union support, from 75 percent when the 
petition was filed to 45 percent when the election was 
held, demonstrates the effectiveness of this propaganda. 
The USWA filed unfair labor practice charges, and hear-
ings began eleven months after the election on June 9, 
1994. The Flamingo Hilton's conduct was so excessive 
that the NLRB is seeking a bargaining order in federal 
court. 
Whatever the results of the legal proceedings, the Fla-
mingo Hilton experience demonstrates the cynicism that 
often underlies nonunion dispute resolution systems. The 
complaint resolution policy is best understood as an anti-
union tool and one component of the Flamingo Hilton's 
systematic assault on its employees' efforts to organize. 
Employer-dominated dispute resolution systems offer 
little promise to workers who seek a legitimate voice in 
the workplace. • 
I 
47 
EMPLOYEE: Linda Cave 
DEPARTMENT: Cage 
"In the beginning of the union campaign I was afraid 
to let my coworkers and management know how I felt 
about the union— 
I raised my hand to disagree with Mark on the benefits 
of a union. Pat Weaver helped me out. Mark was rude 
to her and tried to make us quiet. 
This is the way all of the meetings were conducted. 
He made people feel intimidated. 
The so-called 'pro-union' employees couldn't even 
walk to the restroom without being followed. Anytime 
Joanne Weicht left for the bathroom Merry Hull would 
have some one follow her, usually Bonnie Teays." 
This quote from Linda Cave who worked in 
"the Cage" at EBS reflects the role of in-
timidation in the employer's campaign 
against an independent voice for workers. 
Even the grievance committee set up as an 
alternative to a union was introduced with 
a heavy hand—voting on department rep-
resentatives was mandatory. 
ELECTRONIC BANKING SYSTEM (EBS) is a service sector 
business that audits and processes donations made to its 
clients. Donor information is recorded and mailing lists 
kept up-to-date. Its clients are charitable and other non-
profit organizations such as the Democratic National 
Committee, the National Organization for Women, Green-
peace, Catholic Relief, and various veterans organizations. 
Nearly all of the 137 workers are women. They earn 
minimum wage or a little above, and many are part-timers 
working without health insurance or other benefits. EBS 
also utilizes homeworkers and temporaries. Officers and 
supervisors routinely bang their fists on desktops and 
shout at workers. The building is kept so cold in winter 
that workers perform data-processing tasks wearing 
gloves. The windowless work area is crowded with rows 
of desks and terminals. 
The ACTWU organizing campaign began in November 
1992. Over the course of a weekend, a majority of EBS 
workers signed union cards. Sunday was the day of their 
first union meeting, which was held at a United Automo-
bile Workers local union hall not far from the business 
site. Over a fifth of the work force turned out that after-
noon. Before, during, and after the meeting, owner Ron 
Edens and EBS supervisors sat in parked cars along the 
street outside the union hall. Two of Edens's personal 
secretaries attended the gathering with notepads in hand 
and recorded the proceedings. 
The next day Edens held a two-and-a-half-hour captive 
audience meeting. He cautioned the workers to stay 
away from the union and told them that his secretaries 
had reported back all that was said at the union meeting. 
He threatened to close EBS if a union "came in." He then 
announced a new grievance committee structure and se-
cret ballot elections were held immediately. Supervisors 
distributed makeshift paper ballots to workers, who were 
instructed to elect two representatives for their depart-
ment to serve on the grievance committee. All workers 
were required to vote. The ballots were collected and 
tallied by supervisors and the winning names announced. 
Newly elected worker representatives solicited written 
complaints and suggestions from coworkers. Edens then 
met with the representatives individually in his office to 
negotiate solutions to departmental grievances. 
Over the next few weeks a variety of changes were 
introduced to discourage support for the union. A "no 
talking, no fraternizing" rule was put into effect but 
only enforced against union supporters. Supervisors 
were stationed in the break room, parking lot, and 
building entrances at shift changes and break times. On 
many occasions, Ryan Edens (son of the owner) stood 
at the front entrance and cursed ACTWU supporters as 
they entered the building after morning leafletting. 
Joanne Weicht, rank-and- file leader of the organizing 
campaign, describes what happened to her on Decem-
ber 10, 1992: 
I was standing in the parking lot of EBS at ap-
proximately 6:00 a.m. handing out union leaf-
lets. Ron Edens, Jr. (a supervisor and also son 
of the owner) came out of the building and 
watched. My coworkers carrying leaflets had 
to walk by him to enter the building. He made 
me feel very intimidated.... When I left work 
that afternoon there was an envelope on my 
car with my name typed on it. Inside the enve-
lope were shredded leaflets. I felt that some-
one was trying to scare me to keep me from 
working for the union. 
Mark McQueen, the company's attorney, personally 
conducted captive audience meetings and one-on-one 
sessions. He told workers that most of his clients were 
unions, and that his specialty was negotiating union 
contracts with employers. He then said that this experi-
ence had led him to the conclusion that collective bar-
gaining can take forever without positive results. 
Union supporters were not allowed to leave their 
workstations during the campaign. Supervisors es-
corted them to and from bathrooms. Surveillance cam-
eras were installed by the time clock, in the hallways, 
and by the worker bathrooms. A new "one-at-a-time" 
rule at the copy machine was put in effect. The work-
stations of union activists were moved to face walls. 
While ACTWU supporters were held on tight 
leashes, antiunion employees were permitted to talk 
freely against the union on company time. During the 
week of January 4, Human Resource Director Cathy 
Hart hand-delivered letters to antiunion and undecided 
workers, inviting them to a series of small group meet-
ings at nearby Oliver's Pub. The meetings were held 
each night that week and were conducted by Ron 
Edens, Mark McQueen, Ryan Edens, and Cathy Hart. 
The purpose was to recruit members for "Employees 
Against the Union." 
The tone of the campaign changed dramatically, as 
the recruits passed out their antiunion leaflets and "vote 
no" buttons on their coworkers' desks. They clocked in 
late from morning antiunion pep rallies and roamed 
freely from department to department campaigning 
against the union. The final captive audience meeting 
was held on January 14, the day before the election. At 
the meeting Ron Edens promised workers a new incen-
tive system that was "guaranteed" to result in bonuses as 
high as $90 a week. 
ACTWU lost the vote 65 to 33 and filed objections a 
week later. Subsequently, small groups of four or five 
workers at a time were called into meetings by EBS Vice 
President David Rentschler. He asked them to sign 
some documents. He said that they did not have to 
sign, but that their loyalty would be appreciated. The 
payroll clerk passed out a petition and form letters ad-
dressed to the NLRB. The documents stated that Ron 
Edens did not threaten to close EBS if the workers 
unionized, did not conduct surveillance or use any in-
timidation tactics during the course of the campaign, 
and conducted himself appropriately and fairly. The 
payroll clerk witnessed each signature and verified it on 
the spot by adding her signature. 
One month after the union election more than half 
of the union activists were gone from EBS. Union sup-
porters received blemished evaluations and were denied 
annual wage increases. Several were accused of theft. 
Joanne Weicht was fired in August 1993. ACTWU added 
several unfair labor practice (ULP) charges to its elec-
tion challenge. A hearing was finally held on February 
22,1994, thirteen months after the vote. A settlement 
agreement was eventually reached with EBS in April. 
The settlement called for EBS to post a notice agree-
ing not to interrogate employees about their union ac-
tivities, not to monitor worker attendance at union 
meetings, not to pressure workers to sign statements in 
support of the company, and not to threaten to close 
49 
the company in the event of a union victory. In addition 
EBS agreed not to create an employer-controlled griev-
ance system or to solicit grievances as an alternative to 
unionization. They were ordered to offer Joanne Weicht 
reinstatement with back pay. 
In light of the numerous violations of the law, a rerun 
election was scheduled for June 3,1994. Prior to the 
election Joanne Weicht was reinstated and positioned 
directly in front of a surveillance camera. With no ef-
fective penalties against EBS, the seventeen months that 
had elapsed since the first vote, and the departure of 
many union supporters in the interim, the outcome of 
the second election was never in doubt. The union was 
defeated 53 to 23. • 
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES 
POSTED PURSUANT TO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
APPROVED BY A RKMMAl MKCTOR OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD « « « « » » UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act gives eB eatployees the fbllov/ingrrghsr. 
To engage n eetf organi ratios; 
To form, join or auutUMOS; 
To bus*"1 ooBectivdy rhroiigh a Hyuuiut ivc 
ofihdrovncboioK 
To act together for collective baiaaening or otter 
mutual aid or pretectal; 
To retrain from any and all such actrricka. 
WE WILL NOT engage m surveillance of oar employees soenrsr^nvxtiiigj with AMALGAMATED 
CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION. BALTIMORE REGIONAL AMALGAMATED 
CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, AFL-OO, or aay olker labor c 
WE WILL NOT interrogate our cmploytei about their Union activities and the actraafa of other cn^aoyecs on 
behalf of AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS WKJN. BALTIMORE R£GK)NAL 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, AFL-OO, or any other laboro 
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that we win done and/or move the Hagerattea r^anl rf they siniport 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, BALTIMORE REGIONAL 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, AFL-CIO, or an; other labor ca^amzation. 
WE WILL NOT threaten you that we wgl never bargain with a union. 
WE WILL NOT, by solicibng your ceuipkuuts and grievances, promise you issneaaalbesa^aiyjinaaivved 
terms and cotefiueos of en^noynteat, in order to rcrrrakarccenxvouiotlKcxcn^af IberrglrbgiiaraRaxdby 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relatione Act 
WE WILL NOT ryoouie ycu thai VK wM iajdruK a plaat^a^ 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, BALTIMORE REGIONAL 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, A F I X 3 0 . or any o t e labor organization 
WE WILL NOT create an eaaxetsiott that your union actrvraoi arcimos tuivwIUmby iterjri& mrcrponseto 
yoar complaint] about our cocopuatioo of lists diowingoopkryecc'Urucnsvnopadk^atelrK U r o vosdouv 
the aene thing and that we have to do what we have to 4 ^ nor wul wo triform you amt we know who U for ox 
aa^iasttJ»lJnio^orwrioisrnfAenaliu;lobeiaxa>rtlheUaic<i. 
other rxanxetion with AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORXHtS UNION. BALTIMORE 
REGIONAL AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, AFMnO, <r soy other Ubor 
WE WILL NOT coerce you into wearing or icosiving from us aim-urarm buttons. 
WE WILL NOT interfere with our eroptoyoes' rights under the NalioraJ Labor Rranusu Act by caiuiag a 
superviaor or agent of the Company to act as an observer on our brbalftt a Board^ramuOed election. 
WE WILL NOT verbally criticize our employees by tdlhig rbem tliey are not team esvenbor^uscfery allegedly 
savored AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, BALTIMORE REGIONAL 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, AFL-CIO, or say other tabor orgauiiation. 
WE WILL NOT huarrognte our employees by asking them to e»ecete jtattrnemi arid •rErkvrtj i» support of the 
Ccjoapan/s rjoshxsa nt conaeoion whb un£klr labor p 
against us in the Frjh Region of the National Ubor Relations Board. 
WE WILL NOT selectively and dnparatdy enforce our rulra agamfl solKrUtficn, (httrSwtion, tsfluoa. and 
yrjvavuaerjthyprQhibrlnMJordnyjoM 
norainaoasoliritatiomatiddistiasito 
joined, or assisted AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION. BALTIMORE 
REGIONAL AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, AFL-CIO, or say c*er Ubor 
ore^nuarjoo, on the basis of such affiliation. 
WE WILL NOT direct our employees to elect representatives to sbrm a oonurumx to bargam with us ccsuarrung 
rhe mjages, houit, arnVor wrjrldng orniditicm of onr e ^ 
formation of such a conunhtee or any other hbor organization. 
WE WILL NOT tormmae. employees because they join andassist AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND 
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, BALTIMORE REGIONAL AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE 
I01NT BOARD, AFL-CIO, or nay other tabor oraarn^gtk^ or becsase d ^ e o g ^ ^ m ujuuwed a<avipes, or to 
datoourage them fins engaging m those actrvdiee. 
WE WILL NOT assign employees more onerous and len|iro6tnh)e work ber*use they assisted 
AMALGAMATED CLOTFONa AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, BALTIMORE REGIONAL 
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT BOARD, ArL-ClO. or any other labw orgarniatJon. 
or because they IJ y * in ooncertnd activrum, or to disoourage rhem from raigaging in those activities. 
WE WILL offer JOANNE M WEICHT immriiarr and Ml remn^ariMiittor^fonrCTiobot, rftbatjobrc 
longer exists, to a substantially ernirvalent nosition, without prejud^ 
privileges previousty enjoyed and WE WILL make her v4y*tbrairy lonofearnkia^arsiocrterrjraetareiurhng 
mOThcrttUHjuago,riluaiiskgsat,maorjra<^ 
WEWnXr»iiov«ftT»nourfl«!.nyr«fcmicetollieaBclnrgeofJOANNEM WEICHT and notify bar in 
writing that this has been done and that the diecharge win riot be used aaniiiet Iter in any way. 
WE WILL assign work to LAURA DANNER m a nccslrscrhnisatory rsshirm and we vriB not assign her an unfair 
share of difficult tasks due to her ectnrrbee on b d v ^ o f AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE 
WORKERS UNION, BALTIMORE REGIONAL AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE JOINT 
BOARD, AFL-CIO, or any other labor o 
WE WILL NOT in any like or related raaonsr interfere vtio^ restrain or coerce yt» » t t o eaercUe of d » riata 
gmranttrd you by Section 7 of the Act 
ELECTRONIC BANKINO SYSTEM 
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONF 
EBS agreed to post this NLRB notice admitting to multiple viola-
tions of labor law. Although nominally a form of punishment, such 
postings also remind workers of how far a company will go to re-
sist workers' efforts at self-organization. 
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KMART DISTRIBUTION CENTER • 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) 
NEWNAN, GEORGIA 
A video circulated by Kmart included this 
image accompanied by a warning: "It 
makes no sense to put what we have 
now at risk through Teamster negotiations. 
A Teamster promise is not a guarantee.... 
Without a union we have maintained 
steady employment over the years.... The 
Teamsters didn't create our jobs and they 
won't help preserve them." The implied 
threat of job loss and the locked plant gate 
are the flip side of employee involvement 
in Kmart's campaign to resist its employ-
ees' pursuit of independent representation. 
THE 550 WORKERS at the Kmart Distribution Center 
began organizing with the assistance of the Teamsters 
Local 528 during the summer of 1993- The campaign 
went public in early August, and Kmart was prepared to 
respond immediately. A year earlier the company had 
retained the services of Ogletree and Deaking, a well-
known union-busting law firm.The union filed a petition 
on September 8, with signatures from 60 percent of the 
workers in the unit. The employer challenged the unit 
makeup and the election was delayed until late Decem-
ber. During the four-and-one-half months between the 
public start of the campaign and the NLRB vote, Kmart 
engaged in a variety of actions designed to crush union 
support. 
In order to appreciate the breadth of Kmart's re-
sponse, it is important to understand the basics of its hu-
man resource management system. Full-time permanent 
employees at the distribution center are referred to as 
"associates." Part-time and temporary workers are paid 
about half of the associate wage rate and are hired 
through Olsten Services, an agency with an office on 
site. Openings for associates are often filled by upgrad-
ing the status of part-time or temporary employees. 
Front-line supervisory responsibility is assigned to "group 
leaders." 
Just after the organizing campaign began, Kmart 
created two committees, one named the Associate Rela-
tions Committee and the other referred to as either the 
Employee Involvement Committee or the Verbals Com-
mittee. Associates were urged to volunteer for these 
committees, and company-wide sessions were held to 
promote them and to discuss employee concerns. Union 
activists were barred from the meetings and from serv-
ing on the committees. Based on input through this 
process, production standards were eliminated and 
written warnings were removed from employee files 
and shredded. In addition, worker grievances were 
solicited and addressed. 
While promoting worker input through the Associate 
Relations and Employee Involvement Committees, Kmart 
also implemented a standard antiunion program. A "vote 
no" committee was established, and favors were prom-
ised to some union supporters who agreed to switch 
sides and wear "vote no" t-shirts. Five antiunion videos 
were circulated among the workers to take home and 
view. The videos attacked the IBT and threatened plant 
closure, layoffs, and loss of wages. One of the videos 
took excerpts from NLRB decisions and pieced them to-
gether to create a negative image of unions and collective 
bargaining, concluding that "the NLRB has confirmed this 
message to anyone considering a union: 'collective bar-
gaining is potentially hazardous for employees, and as a 
result of negotiations employees might possibly wind up 
with less after unionization than before.'" 
Antiunion leaflets were also distributed, and meetings 
were held on company time from which open union sup-
porters were barred. One leaflet warned workers that 
they would be permanently replaced when the IBT took 
them out on strike. The captive audience meetings re-
peated the message of the videos with threats of loss of 
jobs, wages, and benefits. Kmart managers insisted that 
"collective bargaining starts from scratch" and presented 
data to show that workers would lose wages and benefits 
if they voted for the union. Group leaders monitored 
union activity and singled out workers for one-on-one 
meetings to discuss Kmart's position. Department man-
agers told workers that Kmart would never sign a con-
tract even if the IBT won the election. Kmart hired a de-
tective agency, recruited workers to "spy on the union," 
and took photos and videos of workers engaged in union 
activity. 
In addition, specific attacks were directed at leading 
union supporters. Three workers were threatened with 
discharge for their union activity. Matthew Bailey, a 
member of the organizing committee, was arbitrarily dis-
ciplined and constantly monitored by group leaders and 
higher level management. For example, Plant Manager 
Clint White berated him for half an hour in front of other 
workers for giving testimony at an NLRB unit determina-
tion hearing. When coworkers Randy Crawford and Carl 
Payton approached department manager Gene Johnson 
to ask him to stop harassing Bailey, Johnson replied, 
"Matthew Bailey is a stupid black mother fucker and you 
all are like sheep and you will follow him right out of the 
gate." 
Later, Bailey brought a UPS envelope with union fly-
ers in it from home and handed out the flyers as workers 
arrived. He left the envelope on a shelf in the employee 
break area so that he could retrieve it at the end of his 
shift and hand out the remaining flyers as second shift 
workers arrived. When Bailey returned to the break 
room the envelope was gone. By the end of the day cop-
ies of the UPS envelope were posted throughout the 
workplace, with a red arrow to Bailey's name and the 
return address and the message: "The Teamsters say this 
is your union—why is this mail coming from Washing-
ton, D.C., to this individual?" Personnel Manager Ken 
Brockman refused to return the envelope or its contents 
to Bailey and told him that anything found on Kmart 
property belonged to Kmart. 
On another occasion Bailey was accused of theft 
from the company store, taken to Brockman's office, and 
grilled for half an hour about it even though he pro-
duced a receipt. After explaining that he was off the 
clock and had done nothing wrong, Bailey left. The next 
day he was given a "notice of correction" for insubordi-
nation because he left without permission—three no-
tices get you fired. On two occasions Bailey received 
verbal warnings, one after being accused of harassment 
by an outspoken member of the "vote no" committee, 
another when a plant guard reported him for "using ob-
scene language against another associate." As Bailey later 
reported in a signed statement for the NLRB, "The ha-
rassment I have been subjected to by management is 
continuous and ongoing. Anyone who knows me knows 
that I do not use profanity—ever." 
The union lost the December 21,1993 vote 301 
against and 229 in favor. A week later the IBT filed 
charges, specifying twenty-one unfair labor practice 
violations. The case is pending, but the best the union 
can hope for is a rerun election in an environment al-
ready poisoned by Kmart's brutal antiunion campaign. 
The treatment of Matthew Bailey and the other union 
advocates betrays the true motive behind Kmart's associ-
ates program and employee involvement committees: 
workers were offered a "voice" only as part of a long-
term strategy to deny them effective independent 
representation. • 
BARGAINING TO EVADE A FIRST CONTRAa 
A s several cases we have already discussed make clear, winning a representation elec-tion does not necessarily secure union protection for workers. Some employers 
simply refuse to bargain, some implement changes uni-
laterally while simultaneously "negotiating" with the 
union, while others engage in traditional bad-faith bar-
gaining (such as withdrawing agreement on bargained 
improvements). 
The most difficult situations faced by workers in first-
contract negotiations occur when the employer has de-
cided in advance to avoid reaching a settlement. Under 
the NLRB's curious distinction between "hard bargain-
ing" (acceptable) and "surface bargaining" (an unfair la-
bor practice), employers need not compromise but 
merely must be willing to meet with the union to dis-
cuss differences. Some negotiators use hard bargaining 
simply to frustrate the process. In other cases employ-
ers use the "hard bargaining" approach to stall for time 
while supporting a decertification campaign. 
Even if the union succeeds in securing a favorable 
ULP decision on charges of bad-faith bargaining, refusal 
to bargain, or surface bargaining, the penalty has no ef-
fect. The NLRB will require the employer to post a 
cease and desist order and to resume negotiations. In 
most cases, a willingness to negotiate once a month is 
sufficient to satisfy the NLRB. In essence, employers 
can avoid agreement indefinitely so long as they are will-
ing to meet periodically with the union. 
The three cases below all involve experienced anti-
union attorneys. We encountered the same attorneys 
utilizing their expertise at nonproductive negotiations in 
different parts of the country in cases involving different 
unions. These union-busting specialists challenge the 
limits of the law on behalf of employers unwilling to bar-
gain seriously with the representative selected by their 
employees. 
DAWN FROZEN FOODS After delaying the start of 
negotiations for several months and then allowing mod-
est progress, this company's attorney took the offensive. 
He refused to consider dues checkoff, union security, 
or plant visitation rights. When the union rejected 
the company's "final offer," he coordinated a standard 
hard-ball union-busting campaign, which ended in 
decertification. 
BETHEA BAPTIST HOME In a case with undertones of 
race and sex discrimination, this company hired an attor-
ney to represent it at negotiations. He refused to con-
sider a "just cause" provision for discipline or discharge, 
and he insisted on a clause allowing hidden surveillance 
to detect theft by employees. A ULP decision that this 
was surface bargaining did little to change the company's 
position, and there is still no contract five years after 
certification. 
ATHOL CORPORATION A third attorney specializing 
in surface bargaining represented this company, and the 
theme was the same—no just cause provision, no griev-
ance arbitration, wage increases based only on "merit." 
After three years the workers staged a one-day strike, 
shocking the employer, who relented and negotiated a 
contract. • 
Dawn Frozen Foods • 
Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers (BCTW) 
CROWN POINT, INDIANA 
The lawyer who negotiated for Dawn Frozen 
Foods conducted this union-free seminar 
one week before the union at Dawn was 
decertified. 
THE WORKERS at Dawn Frozen Foods in Crown Point, 
Indiana, decided to form a union early in 1991. They 
turned to the BCTW for assistance, and International 
Representative Jeanne Graham was assigned to the cam-
paign. The BCTW won the March 28,1991 election by a 
vote of 56 to 41. The workers selected a bargaining 
team, and Graham stayed on to assist with negotiations. 
The company was represented at the bargaining table 
by attorney Robert Bellamy of the firm Barnes and 
Thornburg. The first session was held on June 27. As 
Graham recalls, "Bellamy advised that Dawn had no prob-
lem working with our union and proceeded to explain 
how he was involved in negotiations with two other 
unions which were soon to be over and he asked if we 
would please be patient. Although he could only meet 
once a month now, he said, later large blocks of time 
would be available. This should have been my first warn-
ing. I would never let the company get by with that 
again." 
Negotiations were held July 17, August 15, August 
22, September 9, October 10, and November 17. By this 
time it was obvious that the company was stalling, with 
no movement on even simple issues like a union bulletin 
board. Bellamy would agree verbally to an issue at one 
meeting, then say that the union misunderstood him at 
the next. The company's plan to avoid reaching an agree-
ment became clear early in 1992. In the words of Jeanne 
Graham, "In February negotiations Bellamy informed me 
I was not getting an 'old '60s Bakers' contract,' but a con-
tract which reflected the 'realities of the '90s.' Bellamy 
zeroed in on dues checkoff, union security, and plant 
visitation rights as 'old' clauses. It became clear they in-
tended to hang us up on union security, assuming we 
wouldn't sign a contract without it." 
Meanwhile, whenever the union would raise an issue 
at the table about working conditions, the company 
would refuse to discuss it and then unilaterally imple-
ment changes in the plant. This practice allowed the 
company to demonstrate to workers that conditions 
could improve without a union contract. There was even 
an across-the-board $.75 per hour wage increase at 
Christmas, which the union agreed to only to see the 
company take credit. 
Urged on by supervisors, a group of antiunion em-
ployees began to circulate a decertification petition in 
the spring. On June 10,1992, the group filed for 
decertification and a vote was set for July 8. 
Meanwhile at negotiations the company made what it 
labeled its final offer on June 21. At this stage the BCTW 
was not worried about the decertification vote because 
an internal organizing campaign was in place with sev-
enty-plus workers wearing union hats on the job every 
day. A federal mediator suggested that the union have 
the workers vote on the final offer, noting that the com-
pany had told him that they could count hats and knew 
that they were going to lose the decertification election. 
The members voted down the final offer on June 28 and 
the union requested a new bargaining session. Little did 
they know that they were playing right into Bellamy's 
carefully crafted union-busting strategy. 
Coincidentally Robert Bellamy revealed his true col-
ors on June 30 when he conducted an all-day seminar in 
Indianapolis with an associate from Barnes and 
Thornburg. Sponsored by the Indiana Chamber of Com-
merce, the seminar was titled "Remaining Union Free." 
In the final week before the decertification vote, Bellamy 
practiced what he preached, helping the company run 
an intense antiunion campaign. All of the standard ingre-
dients were there: captive audience meetings, supervi-
sors holding one-on-ones, the owner promising to give 
the workers everything the union had negotiated with-
out union dues, and slides of the plant with a closed sign 
on the door. 
The linchpin came on July 7, the day before the vote. 
Bellamy sent a letter to Graham via certified mail re-
sponding to her request for a bargaining session to dis-
cuss the company's final offer which had been voted 
down: 
That final offer remains final.... 
—What final means is that Dawn is prepared to 
take a strike if its final offer is not acceptable. 
—Final means you have gotten all there is to 
get—there is not one penny more—period. 
—If a strike does occur, Crown Point will of 
course exercise its right to continue operations 
and hire replacements. 
—If you do not believe me when I say that 
something is FINAL, go ask the UAW in 
Cambellsville, Kentucky. After I gave a final of-
fer, they went on strike over an open shop 
clause.. .permanent replacements were hired, 
the union is now gone.... 
FINAL means FINAL. 
The letter was really not intended for Graham but for 
the workers at Dawn. Supervisors hand-delivered copies 
on the shop floor to every employee. The next day the 
BCTW lost the decertification vote 51 to 48. 
Jeanne Graham candidly criticizes the union's bargain-
ing strategy and her own role: "In retrospect, I would 
have never allowed the company to begin negotiations 
by meeting once a month, allowing them the time to im-
prove conditions, stack the plant with temps, and have 
the time for large turnover of original voters. I would 
have dismissed an obviously biased Federal Mediator.. ..I 
would never allow the final offer to come before the 
deceit vote. And, although I'm sure we had the votes 
until the last week, I would have accepted the contract if 
I had to do it over again." 
But the problem was not Jeanne Graham or the 
BCTW's strategy. Workers should not be in a position 
where the choice is either accept only what the em-
ployer is willing to offer or sacrifice union representa-
tion. The company stalled negotiations and engaged in 
surface bargaining, knowing full well that the NLRB 
would not interfere. Then, with the assistance of a 
skilled union buster the company unleashed an efficient 
and intense antiunion campaign based on threats and 
intimidation. The workers at Dawn lost union represen-
tation because the law did not protect their rights. • 
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BETHEA BAPTIST HOME • 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) 
DARLINGTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 
In spite of court victories and financial 
settlements for Bethea workers on race 
and sex discrimination and wage and hour 
complaints, the employer has denied work-
ers the right to independent representation 
on the job. Its lawyers' surface bargaining 
strategy has allowed Bethea to avoid a 
collective bargaining agreement for five 
years since this celebration. 
THE UFCW initiated an organizing campaign at Bethea 
Baptist Home in June 1989 in response to a request from 
the workers there. Most of them African-American 
women, the workers initiated the contact because of 
concern for their treatment at the home, including low 
wages and a pattern of race and sex discrimination. As 
rank-and-file leader Carol Bishop told a newspaper re-
porter at the time,"We are organizing a union for fair 
treatment, respect on the job, and better working 
conditions." 
Pay for the nursing assistants, dietary aides, custodi-
ans, groundskeepers, and laundry employees averaged 
slightly above minimum wage. However, male employ-
ees were paid approximately $1 per hour more than 
women workers performing the same tasks. The most 
blatant indications of race discrimination were a segre-
gated dining area for black employees and segregated 
Christmas parties. A white employee who sat with 
blacks at lunch had been fired, as had a director of nurs-
ing who questioned the segregation. 
The union secured authorization cards from over 70 
percent of the workers in the 70-member unit and filed 
for an election on June 20,1989- An election was held 
August 3 and the union won 50 to 14. The nursing 
home, which is owned by the South Carolina Baptist 
Convention, responded to the union's election win by 
hiring renowned antiunion attorney Julian Gignilliat to 
negotiate. 
At the first bargaining session Gignilliat presented the 
union with a copy of the employer's personnel policies 
(as the union had requested), but he admitted that not all 
policies were included in the documents and that em-
ployees had not been informed of all policies. He actu-
ally stated, "We gave you our policies, but we didn't say 
we followed them." In reference to job descriptions pro-
vided at the same session, he said they "may or may not 
be about real jobs." When asked how employees were 
supposed to know their job assignments, his response 
was, "They get it by osmosis." 
This antagonistic attitude was reflected even more 
clearly in the positions taken by Gignilliat on behalf of 
the employer. Bethea's proposal included a management 
rights clause that affirmed "the right to terminate [a 
worker's] employment at any time, with or without no-
tice and with or without reason." Gignilliat refused to 
consider a union proposal that discipline and discharge 
must be for "just cause." Also, the employer would ac-
cept only a two-step grievance procedure with no 
arbitration. 
Other rigid positions included no dues checkoff, no 
union security of any type, no visitation rights for union 
representatives, and no provision for access to nursing 
home bulletin boards to post notices of union meetings. 
The home also insisted on language guaranteeing unlim-
ited flexibility to use "leased employees and non-bar-
gaining unit employees to perform bargaining unit 
work." Perhaps most insulting, the employer insisted on 
an agreement that would allow the installation of hid-
den cameras to monitor employees and hidden dyes and 
powders to detect employee theft. 
While Gignilliat was protecting management's unilat-
eral authority at the bargaining table, supervisors were 
implementing a campaign against union supporters in 
the workplace. Vocal union advocates were subjected 
to harassment, discriminatory job assignments, reduc-
tion to part-time status, suspension, and discharge. In 
addition to its campaign against individual employees, 
the company penalized all members of the unit by 
withholding two annual raises due in January 1990 and 
January 1991. 
The union filed multiple unfair labor practice (ULP) 
charges beginning on August 25,1989, and a series of 
complaints were issued. The NLRB practice of postpon-
ing hearings in order to consolidate complaints resulted 
in numerous delays, culminating in a sixth consolidated 
complaint on July 31,1991, amended once more on 
September 6,1991. An administrative law judge (ALT) 
held hearings periodically from September 23 through 
December 10,1991. The ALJ decision was issued June 
1,1992, upholding the union on all significant charges 
including discriminatory treatment of union members 
and surface bargaining. The company appealed. 
The NLRB issued its decision January 22,1993, con-
curring with the ALJ. The order required the employer 
to reinstate and/or compensate those union members 
who suffered discriminatory treatment, to grant retroac-
tive annual wage increases due January 1990 and Janu-
ary 1991, and to bargain with the union. The union's 
certification was extended one year from the resumption 
of bargaining. 
Negotiations reconvened in March 1993. The propos-
als for hidden cameras and dyes were dropped. Other-
wise, the employer's position did not change on key is-
sues including employment at will, just cause, and griev-
ance arbitration. The employer also insisted that future 
pay raises be based only on merit. Although certification 
expired in March 1994, support for the union remained 
strong, and negotiations were continuing as of July 1994. 
Eileen Hanson, the UFCW organizer who has assisted 
the Bethea workers throughout the ordeal, questions the 
motives of the owners of the nursing home: 
It is cruelly ironic that a religious organization 
would treat its employees in such a hypocritical 
manner. The South Carolina Baptist Convention 
should remember the scriptures, "My little chil-
dren, let us not love in word, neither in tongue, 
but in deed and truth.".. .These workers have 
expressed their right to bargain collectively, but 
this so-called religious organization continues 
trying to evade its moral, legal, and ethical re-
sponsibilities. ... The meek may inherit the 
earth, but they're not going to do it by working 
at Bethea Baptist Home. 
Although collective bargaining and the NLRB process 
have done little to improve conditions for the African-
American employees at Bethea Baptist Home, litigation 
on other fronts has been more successful. An out-of-
court settlement was reached in a sex and race discrimi-
nation suit ending segregated dining and parties and 
compensating forty-five workers for approximately 
$100,000 in back pay. In addition the union filed a wage 
and hours complaint because kitchen workers and nurs-
ing assistants were required to eat meals at their worksta-
tions and be available for duty but were not being paid. 
A settlement agreement in this case resulted in $82,000 
in back pay for thirty-one employees. • 
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ATHOL CORPORATION • 
Glass Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers (CMP) 
BUTNER, NORTH CAROLINA 
ATHOL CORPORATION manufactures vinyl cloth for use 
mainly in autos, pleasure craft, and school buses. The 
workers at Athol contacted the Glass Molders, Plastics 
and Pottery Workers (GMP) in 1989 about possible union 
representation. The GMP quickly obtained signatures 
from 65 percent of the 250 workers. By the time an elec-
tion was held on October 12,1989, Athol had cut the 
workforce to 170. In spite of the uncertainty caused by 
the loss of 80 jobs, the GMP held on to win the election 
by four votes. 
Negotiations began February 9,1990. The company 
was represented at the table by Robert Valois of the firm 
Maupin, Taylor, Ellis and Adams. This law firm is known 
for its antiunion practices andValois's own specialty is 
advising employers how to avoid final collective bargain-
ing agreements. His performance at Athol was consistent 
with his reputation. 
Under Valois's expert guidance Athol adopted an in-
flexible and regressive bargaining position. Union pro-
posals for a workable grievance procedure, binding arbi-
tration, wage and benefit increases, and dues checkoff 
were rejected out of hand. The company refused to pro-
vide the GMP with information necessary for bargaining, 
such as the number of hours worked by employees. 
Valois would agree to union proposals at negotiations 
only to withdraw agreement at a later session. For ex-
ample, the union proposed a drug and alcohol testing 
program and Valois recommended specific changes that 
would lead to agreement. The union made the changes 
and presented the revised proposal at the next meeting 
but Valois rejected it anyway. 
In negotiations over the next three years the com-
pany would agree only to proposals that were a matter 
of law, such as a no-discrimination clause. Athol pre-
sented two nonnegotiable packages on June 30 and No-
vember 30,1990. The second proposal was only slightly 
different from the first and was labeled the company's 
"final offer." In forty-one bargaining sessions through the 
end of 1992, Athol refused to budge from this package. 
One clause of the final contract proclaimed "the right 
of the company to hire and discharge employees for any 
cause? Consistent with this, Valois refused to discuss any 
union proposals for a "just cause" clause. Athol's pro-
posed grievance procedure included as a last step a 
"company designee" whose decision would be "final and 
binding on the employee, the union and the company." 
The proposal also included an incredibly broad manage-
ment rights clause, and a provision that reserved the 
company's right to discontinue at any time any program 
or policy specified in the agreement. The final offer also 
stated that all wage increases would be merit increases, 
and it explicitly reserved "the right to terminate all pen-
sion plans." The coup de grace was an article that gave 
Athol the right to terminate the contract with six months 
notice. 
While taking a hard-line stance at the negotiating 
table, the company also implemented antiunion policies 
in the workplace. The company held captive audience 
meetings and denounced the union. Athol Executive 
Vice President Garrod Post told employees that their sup-
port for the union was futile and that unions were anach-
ronistic. At another meeting Post announced that Athol 
would never sign a contract with any union. The com-
pany indirectly threatened to move the plant by distribut-
ing a notice to employees that all salaried staff would be 
sent to Spanish classes. This letter raised concerns be-
cause there were no Hispanic employees in the plant. 
Athol also made unilateral changes without consult-
ing with the union. All employees were required to work 
over Christmas week in 1990 in a change from past prac-
tice. Then, the plant was shut down for a week in early 
February 1991 and the union was not even informed at a 
bargaining session three days before the shutdown. Also, 
a quality circle program was introduced unilaterally. 
The GMP filed multiple unfair labor practice charges 
starting in the summer of 1990. In all cases the NLRB 
either dismissed the charges or reached a settlement 
agreement with the employer, often over the union's ob-
jections. Although some of the settlements did correct 
unacceptable company behavior (for example, several 
union supporters who had been fired were reinstated), 
most of the ULP charges had to do with the company's 
refusal to engage in serious bargaining and this did not 
change.The settlements simply required the company to 
return to the table to resume negotiations. 
Particularly frustrating to the union was the NLRB's 
unwillingness to issue a complaint on surface bargaining 
in spite of the company's blatant strategy of avoiding a 
collective bargaining agreement. The closest the NLRB 
came was to issue complaints against Athol in June 1992 
for failure to bargain and for changing working condi-
tions without bargaining. In October 1991, in a letter to 
the union's law firm defending a settlement agreement 
that simply required the company to return to the bar-
gaining table, the director of the NLRB Office of Appeals 
conceded that "the evidence in the case on appeal indi-
cates that the employer engaged in bad faith surface bar-
gaining" and explained that the union's certification 
would be extended to correct for this behavior. How-
ever, Athol was never required to admit any violation of 
the law and was never even tried on surface bargaining 
charges. Expressing his exasperation with the NLRB's 
handling of the Athol case, GMP Area Director Frank Tro-
jan complained, "The Winston-Salem Regional Board pays 
only lip service to charges and appears in the final analy-
sis to be merely a protection for the aspirations of corpo-
rate entities." 
Athol's legal team took advantage of the NLRB's lack 
of resolve. In reaction to the June 1992 charges that it 
had failed to bargain, the company's lawyers responded: 
"Athol is not obligated to make a concession at the bar-
gaining table. The NLRB's complaint represents an un-
warranted intrusion in the collective bargaining process." 
In addition to denying any obligation to engage in sub-
stantive bargaining, Athol also used every opportunity to 
stall and delay the process through legal appeals. When 
served with an NLRB complaint, Athol's law firm of 
Maupin,Taylor, Ellis and Adams filed a "motion for a more 
definite statement," asking for an explanation of the com-
plaint. By the time this motion was denied, three months 
had elapsed since the original complaint; Athol's lawyers 
then filed a "request for special permission to appeal" the 
denial. More delays ensued. Ultimately a hearing was 
scheduled, but eleven days before the hearing a second 
union-busting law firm—Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak 
and Stewart—petitioned for postponement. It seems 
that since Robert Valois was chief negotiator for Athol 
and the complaint dealt with Valois's behavior at the bar-
gaining table, Ogletree had been hired at the eleventh 
hour to represent Athol at the hearing. This maneuver 
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A spokesperson for Athol workers explains 
that their one-day strike is to protest three 
years of meaningless bargaining and to 
send the message that workers want a fair 
contract. 
worked, and the NLRB agreed to postpone the hearing 
indefinitely. 
Incredibly, the union was able to retain broad support 
throughout the period of the bargaining stalemate. Dur-
ing 1991, with the assistance of the Food and Allied Ser-
vice Trades Department, the workers conducted a letter-
writing campaign to customers of Athol, explaining that 
the company did not treat its employees fairly. Athol re-
sponded by harassing members of the local's negotiating 
team. In 1992 when Athol attempted to prohibit a union 
bargaining team member from attending negotiations, 
the local decided to expand membership on the team. 
Athol then announced that it would allow only three unit 
employees to participate in negotiating sessions, and it 
posted a memo designating which members of the 
local's negotiating committee would be permitted to at-
tend. Athol's obstinacy only strengthened the resolve of 
members of the local. 
Frustrated at the inability of the NLRB to force the 
company to deal with the union, the workers took it 
upon themselves to withhold their labor for one day in 
early March 1993 with nearly 100 percent participation. 
As union member Susan Dawson explained to a televi-
sion news reporter covering the strike, "I hope they learn 
to respect us because we are all people. We are the little 
people, but without us they won't have a company. So 
we just want to be heard and treated fair." The company 
was so stunned by the wildcat strike that no retaliatory 
action was taken. Athol had maintained at negotiations 
that the only workers who supported the union were the 
members of the union bargaining team. Once the strike 
occurred the company realized that the union was there 
to stay and began to take negotiations seriously. 
A contract was reached on September 27,1993-
Union membership in this right-to-work state stands at 
90 percent. Although the GMP ultimately prevailed, the 
process took four years. Robert Valois's charade of en-
gaging in bargaining with no intention of reaching an 
agreement successfully manipulated the NLRB process. 
Athol was allowed to evade a first contract and was 
forced to reevaluate only because of a tenacious local 
union, which persisted to beat the odds and outlast the 
employer. • 
CONCLUSION 
The Crisis in Labor Law 
W e believe that the cases collected by the Industrial Union Department ex-pose the false assumption of many casual observers and policy makers 
that blatant union busting is practiced only by a relatively 
small group of extremists in the management commu-
nity. The underlying position of most employers is hos-
tile to employees' rights to organize and engage in con-
certed action. Given the widespread animus displayed 
toward unions and the current state of labor law, em-
ployers' abuse of the right to organize is bounded only 
by the ingenuity of the lawyers and consultants who 
have made this field of practice their specialty. 
We also believe that dramatic change in the law is 
needed to counteract the management union-busting 
convention. Based on the cases we have collected, a 
number of problem areas must be addressed if the right 
of workers to organize is to be protected. 
1. Employers' interference with workers' decisions 
regarding unionization should be curtailed. Steps should 
be taken to limit management's ability to intimidate 
workers with threats, surveillance, and continuous 
pressure. 
2. For employers who openly violate labor laws in 
order to defeat organizing campaigns, the costs of non-
compliance must be increased. Particular attention 
should be given to proposals that would protect union 
supporters from discrimination, especially unjust 
dismissal. 
3. Steps should be taken to speed up the NLRB pro-
cess. Election delays allow management to exploit fears 
and intimidate supporters of independent representa-
tion. One option is to forego an election if a majority of 
workers have signed cards authorizing a specific union 
to serve as their bargaining agent. Delays in certification 
and the start of bargaining should also be reduced be-
cause they deny workers the right to union representa-
tion and contract protection. 
4. Restrictions should be placed on management 
consultants and lawyers serving in a consulting capacity 
during union avoidance campaigns. Penalties also should 
be considered for consultants and law firms associated 
with illegal union-busting activities. 
5. Steps should be taken to ensure that a decision by 
workers to unionize cannot be circumvented by employ-
ers who refuse to engage in good-faith bargaining. This 
could be accomplished by requiring arbitration of first 
contracts if agreement cannot be reached within a speci-
fied time after certification. 
Specific proposals that address these concerns are 
spelled out in detail in the IUD report Workplace Rights: 
Democracy on the Job. As summarized there,"The three 
prerequisites to rebuilding the union organizing process 
in this country are card majority recognition; removal of 
employer interference from the certification process and 
greater union access to employees; and binding arbitra-
tion on the first contract." 
The proposals offered in Workplace Rights would 
place strict limits on employers' ability to thwart the 
right of workers to organize and join unions. They 
would also grant workers a reasonable opportunity to 
consider independent representation in an atmosphere 
free of fear and intimidation. Finally, they would ensure 
that workers through their unions would have the oppor-
tunity to achieve contractual protection via meaningful 
collective bargaining. • 
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 
A companion document which reviews labor law and 
industrial democracy is available from the Industrial 
Union Department: Workplace Rights: Democracy on 
the Job. 
The cases reviewed in this manual were included in a 
different form in a collection of 100 cases, titled The Em-
ployer Assault on the Legal Right to Organize, which 
was prepared for the Commission on the Future of 
Worker Management Relations. An earlier version of the 
report, "Patterned Responses to Union Organizing: Cases 
Studies of the Union Busting Convention," appears in Re-
storing the Promise of American Labor Law, edited by 
Sheldon Friedman, Richard W Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald 
and Ronald L. Seeber (ILR Press, Cornell University, 
Ithaca, N.Y. 1994). 
GLOSSARY 
The following brief definitions explain how these terms are used in the case studies 
Administrative law judge (ALJ) A judicial agent of the 
National Labor Relations Board. 
Bad faith bargaining An action or proposal intended 
to distort the negotiation process in order to avoid agree-
ment, or a bargaining demeanor which indicates that the 
party has no intent to reach agreement. 
Captive audience meetings Meetings conducted by 
employers which workers are forced to attend to hear 
antiunion messages. 
Certification Official designation by the National Labor 
Relations Board that a specific organization has been 
selected by a majority of employees as their collective 
bargaining agent. 
Certification election An election conducted by the 
National Labor Relations Board to determine whether a 
majority of workers support independent representation 
by a specific union or association. 
Decertification A process whereby workers vote to ter-
minate independent representation by a union; the law 
specifies that decertification proceedings be initiated by 
workers independent of the employer. 
Dues checkoff An agreement by employers to deduct 
union dues from the paychecks of workers who autho-
rize it and to transfer the dues directly to the union. 
Dunlop Commission The Commission on the Future 
of Worker Management Relations appointed by the 
Clinton administration to examine laws that govern the 
workplace. 
Good faith bargaining An honest attempt to reach 
a mutually acceptable agreement. 
Hard bargaining Starting with a firm position and 
refusing to budge from it on anything but minor issues. 
National Labor Relations Act (1935) Established 
right of workers to form organizations independent of 
employer control; prohibited unfair labor practices by 
employers which interfere with this right. 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) The govern-
ment agency established to enforce the National Labor 
Relations Act as amended; the Board consists of 5 mem-
bers, the agency has 33 regional offices. 
One-on-ones Meetings between a supervisor and an 
individual worker during which the supervisor presses 
the worker to oppose unionization. 
Representation election Same as certification 
election. 
Self-organization The process by which workers join 
together to form their own association or union indepen-
dent of management. 
Surface bargaining Maintaining the facade of negotia-
tions with no intent of reaching a settlement. 
Taft-Hartley amendments Amended National Labor 
Relations Act in 1947 by adding employers' rights to 
speak against unions; retained workers' rights and 
unfair labor practices specified in 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act. 
Unfair labor practice (ULP) A practice prohibited 
under the National Labor Relations Act as an improper 
interference with workers' rights to independent 
representation. 
Union authorization card (petition) A card (petition) 
signed by a worker designating a specific union or asso-
ciation as his or her representative for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining. 
Unit determination hearing A hearing by a representa-
tive of the National Labor Relations Board to determine 
which workers should be allowed to vote in a represen-
tation election. 
Weingarten rights The right of a worker to indepen-
dent representation during a disciplinary hearing. 
